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ARTICLES

STORIES OUT OF SCHOOL:
TEACHING THE CASE OF BROWN v. VOSS
Elizabeth 1. Samuels*
INTRODUCfION

In a deft parody of conventional education-inspired by a
vote to put a school system on a year-round schedule-the parodist
purports to have unearthed a letter from Huck Finn to Tom Sawyer's aunt, Mrs. Phelps. In the letter, Huck reports on a productive
summer spent in school, studying long hours and earning high
grades. 1
We did get a bit of relief from the daily routine last week
when the entire biology class took a field trip over to Jackson's
Island to collect specimens. The teacher, Mr. Dobbins, complimented me on my ability to identify the aquatic species of the
Mississippi River. He urged me to consider a career in the biological sciences. Did you know, by the way, that the Mississippi
is 2,350 miles long-second only to the Missouri, its primary
tributary, in length among American rivers? It drains 1,231,000
square miles of the central U.S. watershed. A major transportation resource!2

Thus can school interfere with education,3 reducing to an empty
recitation of facts the mystery and the majesty, the moral complexity and the symbolic power of the Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn's Mississippi.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., University
of Chicago School of Law, 1980; A.B., Harvard College, 1975. I would like to thank the
University of Baltimore Educational Foundation and the University of Baltimore Law Library for research support; Leonard O. Kotz and Thomas A. Bums for research assistance;
my colleagues, Robert H. Lande, Jane E. Schukoske, and Barbara A. White, for their helpful comments; and my many colleagues in the academy and in practice who supported and
encouraged my pursuit of this untraditional project.
1 The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 1987, at 27.
2 [d.
3 Mark 1Wain is reported to have said, "I never let my schooling interfere with my
education." EVERYONE'S MARK TWAIN 553 (Caroline T. Harnsberger ed.,. A.S. Barnes &
Co. 1972) (1948). Mark 1Wain also opined, "Soap and education are not as sudden as a
massacre, but they are more deadly in the long run ...." MARK TWAIN, The Facts Concerning My Recent ReSignation, in MARK TWAIN'S SKETCHES NEW AND OLD 265, 265
(Hartford, American Publishing Co. 1879).
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The case method of legal education is traditionally thought to
avoid such reductio ad absurdum by placing the study of law in the
context of the stories out of which the law arises. Karl Llewellyn,
in his classic exhortation to law students, tells them to "visualize
the initial transaction between the parties. Who were they? What
did they look like? Above all, what did each one want, and why
did he want it?"4 He directs the students' attention to the question:
"[W]hat would you, had you been counsel have advised this man
on this point, at each stage of the negotiation? How do you analyze the facts thus far? ... If you can read facts thus. the case is no
longer fiat. It foams as golden as Toronto ale."5
Students can benefit in several ways from such "dramatization"6 of cases. At one level, these dramas, these stories of the
cases, engage their attention and perhaps their sympathies, as well
as provide them with a cognitive bridge from more familiar factual
situations to less familiar modes of legal analysis. 7 At another
level, they enable students to enter imaginatively into the lawyering process by analyzing how the attorneys translated into the language of law the stories brought to them by the parties. 8 Finally,
4

KARL N. LLEWEu..YN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 60 (1960). He continues:
If you can see the facts in their chronological order, one by one; if you can see

them occurring one by one as particuiar people (be they well or ill advised)
were moving to the accomplishment of their desires-if you can see these
desires and feel them in the light of who the parties were and of their situation-then and t!len only will the case become real to you, will it stick in your
head, will the words speak and set your mind to working.
Id.
Id. at 60-61 (emphasis omitted).
Call it, if you will, dramatizing. Call it, if you will, the writing of fiction. It
resembles them at least in this: that to do it will require you to loose your
imagination-but with discipline; will require you first to feel yourself into the
situation as depicted and then to see, to feel the texture and the rough knobs of
each fact.
Id. at 60.
7 See infra notes 309-26 and accompanying text.
8 Lawyers have always been and have always been viewed as storytellers. As James R.
Elkins put it: "Lawyers are enmeshed in stories, first as an audience for the stories of our
clients and then as storytellers ourselves. We listen to clients' stories and retell them to
judges and juries and to other lawyers .... Lawyers are knee-deep in stories." James R.
Elkins, From the Symposium Editor, Introduction to Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium,
40 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1, 1 (1990). In an analysis of feminist narrative jurisprudence, Kathryn
Abrams notes that for trial lawyers, " 'law' is inevitably about presenting concrete and
nonlinear stories, about sensing the features of a narrative that will engage a judge's or
juror's attention or expose the tension in a legal rule. Using and telling clients' stories
requires trial lawyers to make constant assessments of what they mean .... " Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 1043 (1991).
A few legal scholars have written about the process by which lawyers "retell" their
clients' stories. James Boyd White, a professor of English as well as law, has written exten5

6
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they give concrete meaning to the rule applied9 and illustrate its
effect, and thus help students evaluate critically the court's selecsively on this subject. In his Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism, he provides the following subtle description:
Think now of the life of the lawyer: in her conversations with her client, from
the beginning, her task is to help him tell his story, both in his own language
and in the languages into which she will translate it. This conversation proceeds in large part by her questioning, trying to get it straight, suggesting complexities and difficulties, as she tries to help her client understand things more
fully both in his terms and so far as possible in the language of the law ... at the
same time, the lawyer must learn something of the language of the client; between them they create a series of texts that are necessarily imperfect translations of the client's story into legal terms, and in doing·so they also create
something new, a discourse' in which this story, and others, can have meaning
arid force of a different kind: the meaning and force of the law.
JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CuLTURAL AND LEGAL CRm.
CISM 260-61 (1990). Clark D. Cunningham insightfully investigates the role of the lawyer
as translator in A Tale of Tho Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2459 (1989) [hereinafter Cunningham, A Tale of Tho Clients], and in The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CoRNELL L.
REv. 1298 (1992) [hereinafter Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator). C[. James B.
White, Translation as a Mode of Thought, 77 CqRNELL L. REv. 1388 (1992) (commenting
on Cunningham's The Lawyer as Translator) ..
This Article, which analyzes a single dispute between neighbors over the use of an
easement, has grown in part out of my desire to empiriCally explore what Cunningham
describes as "the process by which disputes are transformed from a layperson's initial sense
of injury into legal claims," Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra, at 1300, and to
make one sort of response to the fact that "these transformations have been largely invisible to and unstudied by the legal academy." Id. Work in this area, which has focused
primarily on low-income clients, is increasing and includes: Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2639-47 (1993); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking out of Tum: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 619 (1991); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice
and Theory of Receiving and Translating CLient Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992); Gerald L6pez, ReconceiVing Civit'Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration,77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990). See
also Naomi R. Cahn's discussion of a feminist litigation perspective on translating clients'
stories, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. I, 17 (1991); Homer C. La
Rue's discussion about and example of teaching students in clinical programs to become
effective "partisan" translators, without becoming the storyteller themselves, Developing
an Identity of Responsible Lawyering Through Experiential Learning, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1147 (1992); and William H. Simon's discussion about the difficulty of understanding a
client's view of her case, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD.
L. REv. 213 (1991).
9 As Llewellyn insisted about the emptiness of rules alone,
We have discovered that rules alone, mere forms of words, are worthless. We
have learned that the concrete instance, the heaping up of concrete instances,
the present, vital memory of a multitude of concrete instances, is necessary in
order to make imy general proposition, be it rule of law or any other, mean
anything at all. Without the concrete instances the general proposition is baggage, impedimenta, stuff about the feet.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 4, at 12.
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tion of and application of the rule. 10 In a more general and overarching sense, as a number of philosophers, legal scholars, and
others have suggested, stories may promote kinds of learning and
understanding not facilitated by purely analytical exposition. 11
10 See, e.g., id. at 76-77. The dramatization also, of course, helps students to evaluate
"the court's interpretation or transformation of the raw evidence." Id. at 76.
With respect to the benefits at all of these levels, see infra notes 320-23 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., ROBERT COLES, THE CALL OF STORIES: TEACHING AND THE MORAL IMAG·
INATION (1989) (on moral and psychological insights from narrative); MARTHA C. Nuss·
BAUM, LoVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990) (role of
fictional narratives in moral philosophical inquiry); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHOR.
ITY, AND LAW (1993) (criticism of law based on understanding drawn from methods of the
humanities); HAYDEN WHITE, THE CoNTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION (1987) (narrative discourse in historical thought); Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) (on the role of empathic
narrative in legal discourse). See also the works of James Boyd White exploring a "conception of law ... as an art essentially literary and rhetoncal in nature, a way of establishing
meaning and constituting community in language." WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING
xi (1984); HERACLES' Bow (1985); JUSTICE As TRANSLATION (1990). In the context of
legal education, John Batt discusses "the pedagogical power of narrative" in Law, Science,
and Narrative: Reflections on Brain Science, Electronic Media, Story, and Law Learning, 40
J. LEGAL EDUC. 19, 46 (1990); see also Joseph W. Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2442 (1989) (on using a story about law students to help students appreciate competing
norms in plant closing cases).
Carol M. Rose, in an article on storytelling and the origins of property, discusses how
storytelling or narrative can explain and inspire actions that are not motivated by the rational utility-maximizing preference orderings assumed by classical theory and explained in
game theory. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 55-56 (1990).
[S]torytelJing can both create a sense of commonality, and reorder [the] audience's ways of dealing with the world.... The storyteller places herself with the
audience experiencing the tale; she takes a clutch of occurrences and through
narrative reveals them for her audience as actions . .. in which the audience can
imagine themselves as common participants or common observers.
Id. at 55.
The recent outpouring of many different kinds of legal academic literature using narrative (fictional and nonfictional), and discussing the uses of narrative, embodies numerous
variations on this theme. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL
(1992) (using stories to understand racism in America); NORVAL MORRIS, THE BROTHEL
Boy (1992) (parables written to explore a series of ethical-moral-legal issues); Abrams,
supra note 8 (describing and analyzing feminist narrative scholarship); Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630 (1992) (storytelling in wills law); Jane
B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 255 (1994) (response to Farber & Sherry
article, infra); Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Evidence: Storytelling in the Classroom, 41 AM.
U. L. REv. 453 (1992) (storytelling as recall and review device for teaching evidential concepts); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding
the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REv. 539 (1991) (using autobiographical information in teaching and scholarship); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories out of School' An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807
(1993) (critiquing and acknowledging useful aspects of the "legal storytelling movement");
Paul Gewirtz, Aeschylus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1043 (1988) (images of law in the
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When a case report by itself or supplemented in a casebook provides a sufficiently complete narrative of the circumstances of a dispute, students can and do benefit in these ways,12 while in the
process being introduced to the interplay among doctrine, theory,
and practice13 that will characterize their professional lives.'
As a property law teacher, I have observed these benefits of
the case method, particularly with conducive appellate opinions
and a skillfully assembled text. 14 But I have also experienced, as I
suspect most law teachers have, instances in which a case that lacks
a sufficiently revealing narrative seems to mystify more than elucidate. Although an understanding of the lawyering and the law of a
case depends upon "the brute events outside,"15 the facts can be so
sifted through the litigation process, as Llewellyn warns, that "[w]e
cannot typically trust the facts given in the opinion all the way,
even as a record of a single concrete instance of what the rule has
meant. ... [Y]our hunger must be directed partly to something not
found in law books, but lying beyond and still to be explored. "16
When an incomplete or untrustworthy opinion is not a window on
the story of a case, but instead is a drawn, opaque curtain, can
school interfere with education?
Oresteia trilogy); Richard A. Matasar, Storytelling and Legal Scholarship, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 353 (1992) (call for inclusion of narratives); Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social
Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1243 (1993); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT.
L. REv. 681 (1994) (in Lawyers as Storytellers & Storytellers as Lawyers: An Interdisciplinary Symposium Exploring the Use of Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 18 VT. L. REV.
567-762 (1994».
12 See Taunya L. Banks, Teaching Law with Flaws: Adopting a Pluralistic Approach to
Torts, 57 Mo. L. REv. 443 (1992); Matasar, supra note 11; Richard A. Matasar, Teaching
Ethics in Civil Procedure Courses, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 587 (1989).
13 See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1599 (1991); Sallyanne Payton, Is Thinking Like a
Lawyer Enough?, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233 (1985); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in
Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REv. 577 (1987); Barbara
B. Woodhouse, Mad MidWifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice to Life, 91 MICH.
L. REv. 1977 (1993). The Hastings Law Journal and the Hastings Women's Law Journal
recently devoted issues to a symposium on Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992); 3 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
(1992).
14 One of the property texts in which the case explored in this article appears, Jesse
Dukeminier and James E. Krier's Property, contains a great deal of background infonnation about the cases, as well as handsomely produced drawings and photographs. JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 1993). I suspect that these supplementary materials contribute to the effectiveness as well as the popularity of the text by
situating doctrinal and theoretical issues in concrete, practical contexts. See infra notes
314-19 and accompanying text.
15 LLEWELLYN, supra note 4, at 40.
16 Id.
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For me, teaching a case about a "simple" controversy between
neighbors over an easement brought this question sharply into focus. The case of Brown v. VOSS17 appears in a number of property
law casebooks, including the widely used Property by Jesse
Dukeminier and James E. Krier.1s In Brown v. Voss the State of
Washington Supreme Court departs, in a somewhat disingenuous
way, from an almost universally accepted common law nile and
makes a cross-boundary allocation of property rights. 19 In the process of finding the traditional rule unsuited to the facts of the case,
the court presents what the reader suspects is a highly simplified
narrative of the dispute between the neighboring residential landowners over a right of way across one of the neighbors' property.20
Even the way the property involved in the dispute is described in
the opinion, and represented in a drawing, appears to have been
simplified and abstracted. 21 In my experience, students often find
this case more difficult than more complex cases in the same text,22
and they often wonder with some discomfort what really led the
neighbors to litigate such a "small" dispute all the way through the
court system. As I have led them through different analytical approaches to the opinion, I have felt a bit like Mr. Dobbins, the
biology teacher in the parody: a largely unhelpful repository of, in
my case, empty analytical facts.
715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 14, ~t 835-41 (edited slightly to remove a few
citations and fewer than two sentences). A promotional brochure for the third edition that
was distributed by the publisher of the Dukeminier and Krier text calls it the "#1 Property
Casebook" and lists 135 law schools in which the text is used. The case also appears in
EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA R KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW
384-87 (3d ed. 1992) (omits recital of trial court's findings of fact and part of dissent). The
case is described in a number of other property law texts: RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE
LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUcrORY SURVEY 365 (4th ed. 1991); JOHN E. CRIBBET ET
AL., PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS 633 (6th ed. 1990); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 642-43 (2d ed.
1993).
The case was the subject of a "recent development" note in the University of Washington Law Review. Pamela McClaran, Note, Extending the Benefit of an Easement: A Closer
Look at a Classic Rule-Brown v. Voss, 62 WASH. L. REv. 295 (1987).
The case is also cited in property law treatises: AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 6.02[8][c][iii] n.331 (Arthur R Gaudio ed., 1991); JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHN·
SON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 377 n.50 (3d ed. 1989); ROGER A. CuNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 n.12 (2d ed. 1993); RICHARD RB. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.12 n.24 (1976); 3 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 776 n.ll, § 802 n.28, § 803 n.48 (3d ed. 1939 & Supp. 1994).
19 See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 38~54 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
17

18
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I was drawn, therefore, to explore the circumstances, the stories behind the curiously abstracted narrative of the Brown v. Voss
opinion. What I discovered from the record in the case,23 related
land and other court records, and interviews with the parties was
predictable in some ways and startling in others. As the reader of
the opinion suspects, the conflict between the neighbors had a dark
and bitter emotional history.24 As one cannot easily suspect, the
physical aspects of the property differ in legally significant ways
from the court's description and understanding. 25 When the
supreme court of Washington decided the case, the controversy,
unbeknownst to the court, was moot. 26 And the party who appears
to be the loser in the opinion was in reality the winner.27
This Article proceeds by telling a set of stories about the case
within a story about teaching the case, in the process conveying its
analytical content in part through narrative form. Part I describes
and discusses standard analytical approaches to the story told by
the opinion that are available to the teacher. Part II descriptively
analyzes the narrative strategies behind the lawyers' stories, contrasting their and the court's stories with the stories unearthed by
my research. Part III critically analyzes the lawyers' narrative
strategies. The narrative of one lawyer effectively translated his
client's story and led to the client's victory in court. But the client
lost in reality and might have been better served if his lawyer had
persuaded him to revise his story. The narrative of the other lawyer was an ineffective translation of his client's story, which
23 The full record of the case, on file in the archives of the supreme court of the state of
Washington, appears on its face to be missing two small items. For the purposes of this
Article, nevertheless I refer to the record as if it were complete. The first missing item is
some sort of document that must have accompanied the defendants' cross-complaint and
cited legal authorities in support of their claim. In the Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandlim, the
plaintiffs refer to the authorities cited by the defendants in connection with their crosscomplaint, Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum at 6-8, Brown v. Voss, No. 14076 (Wash. Super.
Ct., July 15, 1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash.
1986). The Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities refers to the Plaintiffs' arguments .
"concerning the cases and authority defendants cited in our cross-complaint." Defendants'
Memorandum of Authorities at 4, Brown v. Voss, No. 14076 (Wash. Super. Ct., July 15,
1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
The second missing'item is a transcript, if one was ever made, of the final oral arguments of counsel at the trial level that were delivered on December 19, 1980, nine months
after the trial of the case. The fact that these arguments occurred is noted in the trial
court's opinion. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, Brown v. Voss, No. 14076
(Wash. Super. Ct., July 15, 1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715
P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
24 See infra notes 92-95, 198-224 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
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thwarted the client's desire to communicate his view of events and
led to his legal defeat. Even though he won in reality, that client
might have been better served if his lawyer had used the client's
story and available physical facts about the property to construct a
compelling narrative justification for applying the traditional common law rule.
Part IV discusses how the analyses in Parts II and III demonstrate the ways in which studying an opinion in its narrative context
can facilitate the kind of learning Llewellyn prescribes. In the case
of Brown v. Voss, a more complete and accurate narrative would
provide students with a concrete, evocative context that would enable them to engage in a more fruitful doctrinal and theoretical
analysis. Students could better comprehend and evaluate the social and economic meaning of the court's decision because they
could assess the court's conclusions about the parties' behavior,
they could contemplate whether the relative value of the parties'
reallocated rights was as disparate and as simple to assess as the
court believed, and they could consider whether the manner in
which the court reallocated the parties' rights was practicable. A
more complete and accurate narrative would also give students an
opportunity to enter imaginatively into the lawyering process. It
would enable the teacher to take up the challenge of law professor
James Boyd White, who has written extensively about law as translation: "[I]f the lawyer is a translator, should we not teach our students how to do what translators do?"28 The kind of teaching
White contemplates "insist[s], across the curriculum, on bringing to
the surface of attention some sense of the different ways in which
the stories of cases we read could be told in different languages and
voices," and it leads the teacher "to call upon our students' sense of
ordinary language, ordinary life, not just as a matter of intellectual
curiosity or political ideology, but with the sense that to do this is
an important part of training in the activity of lawyering. "29
My methods in this Article are, of necessity, and like my subject, in some respects unconventional. To analyze the lawyers' narrative strategies, I have applied to the written records and to my
interviews with the parties some of the techniques of a literary
critic, mining the language of their texts for pieces of evidence,
large and small. In the process of assembling these pieces in Parts
II and III, I have become a storyteller myself because my reader
has not shared the texts and because I have translated the evidence
28

White, Translation as a Mode of Thought, supra note 8, at 139l.

29

Id.
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from them into my own analytical narratives. The lawyers in
Brown v. Voss translated their clients' stories within the peculiar
conventions of their form, the lawsuit. I attempt here to present
the complex web of all these stories within the peculiar conventions of my form, the law review article. I hope I have spun the
threads in a way that permits the reader to perceive not only my
interpretations, but also his or her own patterns of meaning.
I.

THE OPINION

The case of Brown v. Voss involves the question of whether an
owner of a dominant estate that enjoys the benefit of an appurtenant easement-a right of way across a neighboring servient estate-may unilaterally expand the size of the parcel of land that is
benefitted by the easement. 30 The standard common law answer is
that the owner of the dominant estate may not use the easement to
benefit additional property later annexed to the originally benefitted property. 31 Either damages or an injunction are the remedies
available at common law to the owner of the servient estate whose
property is being used to benefit an expanded dominant estate. 32
The supreme court of Washington in Brown v. Voss, while declaring that it accepts this general rule,33 declined to grant the ordinarily available relief of an injunction against a continuing trespass. 34
Reversing the decision of the court of appeals of Washington, the
court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
denying injunctive relief to the owner of the servient estate: the
trial court's factual assessment of the servient estate owners' conduct and of the relative harms to the parties adequately supported
its exercise of discretion. 35 1\vo justices dissented, on the grounds
that the misuse recognized by the majority is a continuing trespass
for which damages would be difficult to measure and for which in30 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 515 (Wash. 1986).
31 Id. at 517; see 25 AM. JUR. 2d Easements and Licenses

§ 77 (1966 & Supp. 1994);
AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 6.02[8][c][iii]; 28 C.J.S. Easements
§ 92 (1941 & Supp. 1994); CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.9.
32 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 6.02[8][c][iii]; see
also infra note 73 discussing the general availability of injunctive relief.
33 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 517.
34 Id. at 517-18; see infra note 73 on the general availability of injunctive relief.
35 Id. The supreme court of Washington reversed the court of appeals of Washington,
which had found that the trial court erred in denying injunctive relief because an injunction
is the superior remedy for a continuing trespass such as the Browns' use of the easement to
benefit the annexed parcel Brown v. Voss; 689 P.2d 1111, 1114-15 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984),
rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). The court of appeals also found that a balancing of the
equities was inappropriate because the Browns should have known that the easement did
not provide access to the annexed parcel. Id.
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junctive relief is the proper remedy, regardless of whether use of
the easement to benefit non-dominant property would actually increase the burden on the servient estate. 36 The dissenting opinion
noted that the Browns could pursue a statutory procedure for condemnation of a private way of necessity.37
Of the unneighborly dispute that led to the litigation, the
Washington Supreme Court tells the following simple story, illustrated with a stylized drawing that is reproduced in Figure 1 below.
In April 1977, the Browns 38 bought the dominant estate-Parcel B
in the drawing-and then, four months later, bought the adjoining
Parcel C from a different seller. 39 In the drawing, Parcel C looks
approximately the same size as Parcel B. The owner of Parcel B,
under the terms of an express grant made in 1952, had a right to
use a private road easement across Parcel A, and other parcels lying to the south of Parcel A, for access to Parcel B.40 All three of
the parcels bordered the Hood Canal. 41 At the time of the
Browns' purchase, there was a single-family dwelling on Parcel B.
The Browns planned to remove this house and replace it "with a
single family dwelling which would straddle the boundary line common to parcels Band C. "42 To this end the Browns, in the fall of
1977, began clearing the two parcels and moving fill materials. 43
At some later date, the owners of Parcel A, the Vosses,
"placed logs, a concrete sump[,] and a chain link fence within the
easement."44 On March 23, 1979, the Browns sued the Vosses for
the removal of these items, for an injunction against interference
with the use of the easement, and for damages. 45 In response, in
36 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 518-19 (Dore, J., dissenting) Goined by Justice Goodloe).
Justice Dore's dissent rejects a balancing of hardships, noting that the "Browns are responsible for the hardship of creating a landlocked parcel. They knew or should have known
from the public records that the easement was not appurtenant to [the annexed parcel]."
Id. at 519. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
37 Id. at 519.
38 The court additionally objectifies the characters in its narrative by referring to them
as the plaintiffs and the defendants, id. at 515-18, as did the trial court, Brown v. Voss, No.
14076 (Wash. Super. Ct., July 15, 1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd,
715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). The intermediate court of appeals, which reversed the trial
court, referred to the parties by name. Brown v. Voss, 689 P.2d at 1111. Although I have
otherwise attempted here to describe the narrative related by the high court, I have used
the parties' names to avoid confusion.
39 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 515.
40 Id. at 517.
41 See Fig. I, infra page 1455.
42 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 515.
43Id.
44 Id. at 516.
45 Id.
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April of that year, after the Browns had spent more than $11,000
preparing their property for building, the Vosses counterclaimed
for damages for trespass and for an injunction barring the Browns
from using the easement to benefit property other than Parcel B.46
The opinion does not include the information that the Vosses made
a motion that summer for a temporary restraining order, which was
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Parcel C (Non-dominant tenement)
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Hood
Canal

Parcel B (Dominant tenement)
Road

Parcel A (Servient tenement)

Property of others (Servient tenements)

FIGURE 1. Drawing that appears in the Supreme Court of Washington's
opinion, 715 P.2d at 515.

denied,47 or the information that when the trial began the following
spring, the parties had limited the issues to the single question of
46 [d. at 515. The court misstates the amount that the Browns had expended before the
Vosses filed their counterclaim. The Browns presented evidence at trial that they expended $7,500 before that date, and a total of $11,000 before the case came to trial. See
infra note 170 and accompanying text.
47 Order Denying Temporary Injunction, Brown v. Voss, No. 14076 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
July IS, 1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash.
1986). The motion and denial are not mentioned in the supreme court of Washington
opinion.
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whether the Browns could use the easement to benefit Parcel C as
well as Parcel B. Before trial they had reached an agreement
about the exact location of the easement, and they had agreed to
an award of nominal damages of one dollar to the Browns for the
Vosses' interference with the easement. The Vosses had agreed not
to pursue their claim for damages for trespass. 48
From an extensive quotation of the trial court opinion, the
reader of the high court opinion learns that the trial court concluded there was "no unreasonable use of the easement"; that
there were "no complaints of unreasonable use of the roadway to
the south" of Parcel A by the owners of other, more southerly servient parcels; and that there was "no increase in volume of travel
on the easement. "49 Without access via the easement, the trial
court found, Parcel C would be "landlocked," and the Browns
"would not be able to build their single family residence in a manner to properly enjoy the view of the Hood Canal and the surrounding area as originally anticipated at the time of their
purchase. "50 Furthermore, a trespass by the Browns over a little
comer of the Vosses' property was "inadvertent" and "de
minimis," and the counterclaim filed by the Vosses was "filed as
leverage" against the original claim filed against them by the
Browns. 51 The trial court awarded each party one dollar in dam48 Trial Transcript, pt. I, at 2-5, Brown v. Voss, No. 14076 (Wash. Super. Ct., July 15,
1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986); Plaintiffs' 1i"ial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 1-2; Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities,
supra note 23, at 1-2. At trial, the Vosses' lawyer said somewhat ambiguously that there
were
two prongs to what we are seeking here today. No.1, we claim there has been
a trespass in that there has been corner-cutting and going up the hill, the upper
part of [Parcel C); that is No. 1. No.2, we claim that, as a matter of law, ... the
Browns are not entitled to use this access here to service [Parcel C).
Trial Transcript, supra, pt. I, at 5. However, in his later-filed Memorandum he agrees with
the Browns' lawyer that
the key issue here is whether the easement may be used to benefit the nondominant [parcel C) for which no provision was ever made in the express grant.
As the plaintiffs point out in their trial memorandum ... , "The only issue left
... [] is the counter[c1aim] of the defendants that the plaintiffs should not be
allowed [ ] 'to a portion of their property.' "
Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities, supra note 23, at 1-2.
The supreme court of Washington opinion does not relate these facts about the agreement between the parties and the narrowing of the issues before trial. The court of appeals
of Washington opinion does relate that, "Before trial, the parties agreed to relocate the
easement. The trial court's order reflected this agreement. . .. The parties also agreed to
settle their claims, except for the Vosses' request for an injunction." Brown v. Voss, 689
P.2d 1111, 1113 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986)..
49 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 516 (quoting the trial court's findings of fact).
sOld.
51 Id.
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ages-"the awards offset each other"-and denied the Vosses' request for "an injunction to restrain the [Browns] from using the
easement for ingress and egress to parcel C for the construction
and use of a single family residence ... to be built partly on parcel
B and partly on parcel [C]."52 The damage awards were not appealed. 53 The trial court granted the Browns the right to use the
easement to benefit Parcel C as well as Parcel B, so long as they
used the two parcels "solely for the purpose of a single family
residence. "54
The supreme court of Washington's spare and conclusory narrative is devoid of any particulars of the parties' dealings with one
another. Perhaps because of this paucity of information, the opinion suggests a great deal. There is a human inclination to supply a
narrative context that plausibly explains the parties' actions, an inclination that leads the reader to "fill in the blanks. "55 As students
and I have read the case, its recitation of facts suggests, although it
does not say, that the Vosses knew that the Browns had purchased
both parcels and knew that the Browns intended to build a single
structure, a new single-family house that would straddle the boundary line between Parcel B and Parcel C. The opinion relates the
trial court's finding that the Browns acted reasonably, 56 a finding
which the reader might assume would mean, inter alia, that they
had communicated their plans to the Vosses, and that the Vosses
"sat by for more than a year while [the Browns] expended more
than $11,000 on their project."57 That the Browns had been engag52 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 23, at 5; see also Brown v. Voss,
715 P.2d at 516.
The trial court's award of one dollar in damages to the Vosses was inconsistent with
parties' agreement before trial that the Vosses would not seek any damages. See supra
note 48 and accompanying text and infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text (although
the parties had settled their damage claims, the Vosses' lawyer presented evidence relevant
to his clients' abandoned claim).
The court denied both parties' requests for attorney's fees. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 23, at 5. And the court denied the Vosses' "request for a
mandatory injunction compelling the [Browns] to remove the road which they have constructed on their property," id., although the Vosses had abandoned their request for such
relief before trial, Trial li'anscript, supra note 48, pt. I, at 2-5; Plaintiffs' Thai Memorandum, supra note 22, at 1-2; Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities, supra note 23, at 1-2.
53 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 514.
54 Id. at 516.
55 "[A] text provides only part of the information that a reader needs to make sense of
the situation that it describes. The reader supplies the rest." Robert Glaser, Cognitive
Science and Education, 40 INT'L Soc. SCI. J. 21, 26 (1988).
56 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 516.
57 Id. at 518 (emphasis added); see supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the
inaccuracy of the dollar figure).
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ing in the highly visible activity of clearing trees and moving fill
materials58 alone suggests that the Vosses must have known the
Browns' plans.
The opinion further suggests that some animosity developed
between the parties even though the Browns' use of the easement
imposed no hardship on the Vosses. 59 This animosity is suggested
by the presentation of the facts that the Vosses prevented or seriously interfered with60 the Browns' reasonable use61 of the easement and that when the Browns responded with a lawsuit, the
Vosses brought their counterclaim solely for leverage for opposing
the suit. 62 The story related by the opinion perhaps even suggests
that the Vosses, although they had been adjudged to owe only one
dollar in damages,63 then spitefully pursued their unsuccessful
counterclaim to the intermediate appellate court in order to thwart
the Browns' plans to enjoy Parcels Band C. In my experience,
students express puzzlement over and disapproval of the Vosses'
actions, reactions that may account in some part for many students'
strong approval of the supreme court's decision.
In teaching the case, with this spare but suggestive narrative as
our only context, I have pursued a standard variety of analytical
approaches with my students. We have examined the traditional
common law rule that prohibits use of the easement to access both
Parcels Band C, the other possible legal theories under which the
Browns might be permitted to use the easement to access both parcels, the approach adopted by the court in the opinion, and the
policy arguments in favor of and against the court's approach.
The threshold task, of course, is to understand the operation
of, and reasons for, the underlying common law rule, which the
court purports to leave undisturbed: that the owner of the dominant estate benefitted by an appurtenant easement may not unilat[d. at 515.
The opinion relates the trial court's finding that:
Other than the trespass [-a "slight inadvertent trespass" over a " 'little' corner" of the Vosses' property-] there is no evidence of any damage to the
[Vosses] as a result of the use of the easement by the [Browns]. There has been
no increase in volume of travel on the easement .... There is no evidence of
any increase in the burden on the subservient estate ... .
[d. at 516. And, "there is and will be no appreciable hardship or damage to the [Vosses] if
the injunction is denied." [d.
60 The opinion relates that the trial court found the Vosses "placed logs, a concrete
sump and a chain link fence within the easement." [d.
61 [d. at 518.
62 The opinion relates the trial court's finding that the Vosses' "counterclaim was an
effort to gain 'leverage' against [the Browns'] claim." [d.
63 "The trial court awarded each party $1 in damages." [d. at 516.
58
59
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erally expand the size of the dominant estate and may not use the
easement to benefit the enlarged property.64 The express grant of
the easement was a transfer of an interest in the servient estate,
Parcel A, to the owner of the dominant estate, Parcel B. The
owner of the servient estate granted a right to use his land for the
benefit of, and only for the benefit of, the dominant estate specified in the grant, that is, for the benefit of Parcel B. The owner of
the servient estate, having parted with one stick from the bundle of
rights he holds as the owner of private property, retained all of the
other sticks in his bundle. 65 Under the traditional common law
rule, the task of a court in a dispute between owners of the dominant and servient estates is simply to apply a bright-line rule. The
court need only determine whether all of the land that the dominant estate owner seeks to benefit by using the servient estate is or
is not part of the original dominant estate.
In considering what possible legal theories might nevertheless
allow the Browns to use the easement to benefit non dominant
property, students discuss easements by necessity, by prescription,
and by estoppel, all of which they have encountered earlier, as well
as the availability in the state of Washington of a private condemnation statute. These three types of easements represent what Professor Stewart Sterk identifies as departures from the ordinary
"geometric-box allocation" of property rights-instances in which
a court steps in to reallocate property rights across boundary
lines. 66
The first, an easement by necessity, may arise only when the
servient and dominant estates originally belong to one owner and
when a strict necessity for a right of way across the servient estate
is created at the time that the original owner conveys one of the
parcels to another person. 67 But in Brown v. Voss, Parcel Chad
not been previously owned in common with Parcel A. The series
of easements serving Parcels A and B, as well as additional lots to
64

See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
See CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.2, for a brief summary of the work of
legal philosopher Wesley Hohfeld and its role in the Anglo-American property law concept that ownership of personal or real property is composed of distinct, "smaller segments
or 'interests.' ..
66 Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 55
(1987). See infra notes 261-62, 275-80, 288-90 and accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.5. Alternate justifications for the
easement by necessity are: (1) that as in the case of easements by implication, the parties
intended to create an easement; and (2) that regardless of the parties' intentions, the court
will find an easement in order to make the landlocked property usable. See DUKEMINIER
& KRIER, supra note 14, at 820-21 (note on easements by necessity).
65
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the south, are part of private land use arrangements that include
only land lying to the south of Parcel C. 68
With respect to the possibility of an easement having arisen by
prescription, the Browns' use of the easement to benefit both Parcels Band C was obviously of too short a duration to have established any rights in this manner.69 In some jurisdictions, however,
if the Browns' use was granted by what is ordinarily a revocable
oral license, and if the Browns changed their position in reliance on
the license, then the Vosses' ability to revoke their permission
might be restricted by the courts, essentially creating an easement
by estoppePO Students observe that there appears to have been no
such claim of an easement by. estoppel in Brown v. Voss, and, in
any event, no state of Washington cases have adopted such a limitation on the power of a landowner to revoke an orally granted
license.
Students also discuss the possibility of the Browns using an
existing state of Washington statute to privately condemn the
Vosses' land for the purpose of obtaining access to their property.
In the dissent, Justice Dore notes that granting an injunction in the
case "would merely require the Browns to acquire access to Parcel
C if they want to build a home that straddles Parcels Band C. One
possibility would be to condemn a private way of necessity over
their existing easement in an action under [Revised Code of Washington section] 8.24.010."71 There is no indication in the opinion
that the Browns sought relief under this statute, and no explanation as to why they might have chosen not to pursue a private
condemnation. 72
Students then return to the opinion itself to discuss whether
the court in Brown v. Voss, although purporting to accept the traditional bright-line rule on the expansion of dominant easements, in
effect departs from that rule by permitting the trial court to deny
68 As illustrated in Figure 2, infra, at 1481, the easement over Parcel A was part of a
road or driveway that provided access from Highway 101 only to Parcels A and B and the
four parcels lying to the south of those parcels.
69 WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 4.16.020 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing a ten-year statute of limitations for actions to recover real property).
70 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 14, at 801-06.
71 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 519 (Wash. 1986) (Dore, J., dissenting). The state statute provides that an owner of land
so situate with respect to the land of another that it is necessary for its proper
use and enjoyment to have and maintain a private way of necessity ... may
condemn and take lands of such other sufficient in area for the construction
and maintenance of such private way of necessity . . . .
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 8.24.010 (West 1992).
72 See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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on equitable grounds what would ordinarily be available, an injunction for a continuing trespass. 73 It has been difficult for some
students to entertain the notion that this decision is in effect a departure from the traditional bright-line rule. Perhaps it is difficult
73 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 6.02[8][c][iii]; CuNNINGHAM
ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.9, at 459-60; see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 38-39 (1991). The dissent explains that the misuse of the
easement to benefit Parcel C is "a continuing trespass for which damages would be difficult
to measure. Injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy under these circumstances .... And
when an easement is being used in such a manner, an injunction will be issued to prevent
such use." Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 518-19 (citations omitted).
The analysis in Part III of this Article supports the conclusion that cross-boundary
allocations of rights, whether outright or accomplished by the denial of injunctive relief,
are not appropriate in these cases because they do not present the kinds of bilateral monopolies that justify such a reallocation and because they do not present the kinds of situations in which a cross-allocation of rights is appropriate for enforcing a social norm of
neighborliness. See infra notes 261-70 and accompanying text; John W. Weaver, Easements
Are Nuisances, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 103,141 (199O). Contra Robert Kratovil,
Easement Law and Service of Non-dominant Tenements: Time for a Change, 24 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 649 (1984) (neither equitable relief nor damages should be available so
long as court finds no unreasonable or unconscionable increase of burden).
A handful of opinions since 1930-one federal district court, two other state high
courts, and two state intermediate appellate courts-have taken a similar approach to
Brown v. Voss, finding a misuse of an easement to benefit non-dominant property but
denying injunctive relief on the basis of a weighing of relative hardships. National Lead
Co. v. Kanawha Block Co., 288 F. Supp. 357 (S.D. W. Va. 1968) (to enjoin use of adjoining
tract for storage would seriously impede efficiency of dominant estate owner's operation
and would be of little or no benefit to servient estate owner, in a case in which burden
would have actually increased without use of adjoining land for storage); Carbone v. Vigliotti, 610 A.2d 565 (Conn. 1992) (denying injunction when character and extent of use of
enlarged dominant estate, construction of two-family house, was same as was envisioned
for original dominant estate); Wetmore v. Ladies of Loretto, 220 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. App. Ct.
1966) (denying injunction when misuse was "trivial and inconsequential," in case in which
servient estate owner himself conveyed annexed land to dominant estate owner, and burden on easement had been greatly reduced by use of alternate access over annexed land);
Ogle v. 'Trotter, 495 S.W.2d 558 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (denying injunction because burden
not greater than originally imposed for ingress to and egress from dominant lot, in case in
which burden was actually materially decreased); Chafin v. Gay Coal & Coke Co., 156 S.E.
47 (W. Va. 1930) (injunction denied because of "great disproportion" of expense and inconvenience, in case in which dominant landowner's bringing coal from much smaller tract
of land to processing facility on dominant estate financially benefitted large group of persons who each owned part of servient estate, and plaintiff was the only one to deny consent). Citing only this last case, C.J.S. states: "it has been held that, where the additional
burden is relatively trifling, the user will not be enjoined." 28 C.J.S. Easements § 92 (1941).
A "recent development" Note on Brown v. Voss argues that Brown v. Voss and a
number of the cases cited above were incorrectly decided because a court's weighing of
relative hardships to determine whether injunctive relief is available will reduce predictability and increase litigation. McClaran, supra note 18, at 303-04, 308-09. The Note argues that a court's equitable power to deny injunctive relief for this kind of misuse of an
easement "should be reserved for extreme cases" that "threaten economic waste and bestow substantial and unequal power." Id. at 309. Brown v. Voss was not such an extreme
case because of the availability in the State of Washington of an action to condemn a
private way of necessity. Id. at 304 n.66.

1462

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1445

for them because the authoritative voice of the majority opinion
simply tells the reader, first, that it accepts the common law rule,
and second, that traditional equitable principles are always applied
in considering a request for an injunction74 and that, "based upon
the equities" in the case, "the trial court acted within its discretion"
when it denied the injunction. 7s
In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, the trial
court did not apply a bright-line test of whether the land sought to
be benefitted by the easement is or is not part of the original dominant estate. Instead the court undertook the more amorphous task
of evaluating the parties' conduct and of weighing the harm to the
servient estate owner if the injunction were denied against the
harm to the dominant estate owner if the injunction were granted.
This distinction between rules and standards is a theme running
through the property course, the contrast between "crystals and
mud" in Carol Rose's evocative terminology.76 Students may compare how the court in Brown v. Voss had a choice between a brightline rule and a more amorphous standard, unlike the courts in the
cases they have encountered involving disputes not over the expansion of the dominant estate but over the scope of the original easement, that is, disputes over the nature and extent of the dominant
estate owner's right to use the easement to benefit the original
dominant estate. In such cases, the court, of course, has no choice
but to apply a standard, under which it must determine the scope
of the easement intended and anticipated at the time of the easement's creation. 77
74

Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 517.
Id. at 518. The majority of the court, considering the relative hardships to the parties
and the question whether there was "actual and substantial injury sustained by the person[s] seeking the injunction," id. at 517, concluded that the denial of relief was supported
by the following facts found by the trial court. The Browns acted "reasonably," while by
contrast the Vosses "sat by for more that a year while [the Browns] expended more than
$11,000." Id. at 516. The Vosses filed their counterclaim "to gain 'leverage' against [the
Browns'] claim." Id. at 518. The Browns would suffer considerable hardship if an injunction were granted, whereas the Vosses had suffered no actual damages from the Browns'
use of the easement, and, with only a single-family house on the Browns' land, there would
be no increase in the burden on the Vosses' land or in the volume of travel on the easement. Id.
76 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988).
77 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 6.02[7]; 25 AM. JUR.
20 Easements and Licenses §§ 72-75, 77 (2d ed. 1966 & Supp. 1994); TIFFANY, supra note
18, § 809.
Robert Kratovil argues in Easement Law and Service of Non-dominant Tenements,
supra note 73, however, that the same standard, rather than a bright-line rule, should apply
to the use of easements to benefit non-dominant property.
75
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In assessing the court's choice in this case, students may go
through what by that time in the semester has become a familiar
catalog of policy considerations of rights, fairness, expectations, judicial administrative burden and competence, and instrumental
consequences, including economic ones,78 continuing to discuss the
case in the context of the opinion's spare but suggestive factual
narrative. Should the court alter the previously established property rights of the parties? Is the rule or the standard fairer, and
which is more consistent with the parties' expectations? Is the rule
or the standard preferable from the perspective of judicial administration? Should the courts decide when it is appropriate to allow
the unilateral expansion of dominant estates or should they leave
the matter to the legislative and executive branches, which in the
state of Washington hav,e provided private condemnation procedures for .owners of landlocked property?79 Economically and socially, will the rule or the standard have more beneficial effects in
the community? In discussing the last question, students may grapple with the relevance of the Coase theorem and the possible problem of high transaction costs in a bilateral monopoly situation that
could prevent the parties from reaching an economically efficient
agreement on their own. 80
On the basis of the opinion alone, a majority of my students
have strongly favored the court's result. Like the court, they have
stressed the reasonableness of the Browns' plans, the hardship the
Browns would suffer if an injunction were issued, and the lack of
adverse effects on the Vosses if an injunction were denied, even
though, as one student commented, a judicial reallocation of entitlements to achieve a more economically efficient result "flies in
the face of private property." From a social perspective, they have
stressed in support of the outcome that the Vosses were probably
attempting to interfere with the Browns' plans out of spiteful motives unrelated to concerns about the use of the easement.81
II.

THE STORIES

Today there is no longer an easement across the Vosses' Parcel
A providing access to the Browns' Parcels Band C. The Browns
78 See James Boyle, The Anatomy of A Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1003, 1055-60
(1985) (outlining various policy arguments); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
79 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
80 See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text, describing and discussing this issue.
81 See infra notes 296-307 and accompanying text, applying a "social norm of neighborliness" to the case. '
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never built their house. Before the supreme court of Washington
issued its decision in March 1986,82 the Browns had forfeited Parcel
B for failure to make payments on the land installment contract
they entered into with the original owner, Mrs. Christensen. 83 The
Browns had also lost Parcel C before the decision of the supreme
court, in a tax sale conducted by Mason County in January 1986, as
a consequence of their failure to pay taxes on the property for a
period of more than three years. 84 Thus Parcels Band C were no
longer in common ownership. Shortly after the supreme court of
Washington's decision, the Vosses bought Parcel B from Mrs.
Christensen,85 thereby merging Parcel A and Parcel B into common ownership, terminating the bitterly contested easement. 86 The
Browns had left behind on Parcel B stacks of cedar shake shingles
and old tires, which Mr. Voss sold and which helped defray his litigation expenses,87 as well as new power lines,88 a deep new well,89
and a new structure. 90 The Browns' victory in the seven-year legal
82

83

Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
Default Judgment, Christensen v. Brown, No. 85-2-00091-2 (Wash. Super. Ct., Jan. 6,

1986).
The trial court judgment in the Browns' favor was issued in July 1982. Brown v. Voss,
No. 14076 (Wash. Super. Ct., July 15, 1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984),
rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). By the fall of 1983, the Browns had stopped making
payments on Parcel B. Complaint at 5, Christensen v. Brown, No. 85-2-00091-2 (Wash.
Super. Ct., Apr. 27, 1985). A year after the Browns stopped payments, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Brown v. Voss, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd,
715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). The following spring, Mrs. Christensen filed the suit to regain
her property, Complaint, supra, that resulted in an order of default against the Browns in
January 1986, two months before the high court decision. Id.
Mr. Voss said he told his lawyer in 1985 about Mrs. Christensen's pursuing a forfeiture
and quiet title action against the Browns. He speculated that his lawyer had not done
anything in response to the information because Mrs. Christensen's court action had not
yet concluded. Interview with Fred R. Voss, Defendant, in Lilliwaup, Wash. (July 3, 1992)
[hereinafter Interview with Mr. Voss].
The Browns' lawyer was notified in March 1985 that Mrs. Christensen had elected to
declare a forfeiture and cancel the installment land contract. Declaration of Forfeiture and
Cancellation of Contract, Mar. 22, 1985 (document indicates it was sent to a specified list of
persons, including the Browns in Alaska and their lawyer in Washington).
84 See Tax Deed from lreasurer of Mason County, Wash. to Chris and Cathy Patzer,
recorded Jan. 14, 1986 (sale conducted Jan. 10, 1986).
8S Deed from Alphilde A. Christensen to Fred R. Voss and Hattie G. Voss, recorded
May 15, 1986.
86 When a dominant and servient estate merge, that is, when they come into common
ownership, the easement is extinguished. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 18, § 6.02[8][a]; CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.12.
87 Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83. He sold these items for several hundred
dollars. Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
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contest had conferred no practical benefit on them. The outcome
reminds one of Abraham Lincoln's admonitions: "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you
can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real
loser-. in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the
lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will
still be business enough. "91
A.

Mr. Brown's Storiescn.

By the time the case was decided by the supreme court of
Washington, Mr. Brown had relocated to Alaska in the wake of his
financial reverses. 93 I reached him there by telephone, in the remote town of Metlakatla. He insisted he did not want to talk about
the case but allowed me to persuade him to discuss it briefly.94 He
referred to the litigation as "an unpleasant part of my past" that
involved "very unpleasant people [and] very unpleasant circumstances. "95 He reported that he entered into the purchase agreements for both Parcel B and Parcel C without the advice or
participation of a real estate broker or lawyer. 96
Like Parcel A, Parcels Band C are long, narrow lots that slope
up a fairly steep hill from their eastern boundary, the Hood Canal,
to their western boundary. Parcel C, however, unlike Parcels A
91 Abraham Lincoln, Lecture Notes, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LiNCOLN 81, 81 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
92 I refer to Mr. Brown's and Mr. Voss's stories, rather than to the Browns' and the
Vosses' stories, because it was they who were the real antagonists in the dispute, as the
following accounts demonstrate.
By using the plural "stories" in the subheadings in this Part, I mean to include the
representations of events made on the parties' behalf by their lawyers as well as "what
really happened"-or, somewhat more accurately, the events viewed from my own
perspective and, to the extent that it is possible to know and say, the events viewed from
the parties' perspectives. I assume that my translations of all of these stories into the words
of this Article-like all translations-"involve[] significant gains and losses in meaning."
White, Translation As a Mode of Thought, supra note 8, at 1393.
93 A computer search of available databases by a private research firm reveals that
there were six court cases involving either Mr. Brown or a company he owned, in two other
counties, that were filed in the early 1980s and are labelled either "collection" or "foreclosure." Attorneys' Information Bureau, Inc., Seattle, Wash., Aug. 5, 1994 (print-out of research results on file with author). See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
94 Telephone interview with Willard H. Brown, Plaintiff (June 8, 1994) [hereinafter Interview with Mr. Brown]. Mr. Brown reported that he is the director of the Indian Housing Authority. He had not returned my earlier call to a prior residence in Anchorage,
Alaska. When I located him again, and reached him by telephone, he told me that he had
not called back because he did not want to talk about the case. Nonetheless, in response to
my questions, he did consent to speak with me about the matter for half an hour. Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.

1466

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1445

and B, is wedge- or pie-shaped, becoming much wider as it slopes
upward to the west. 97 The Browns began work on their two parcels
in the fall of 1977, starting to clear parts of them98 and extending
the road from the easement over Parcel A to part of the way across
Parcel B, towards Parcel c. 99 The next spring and summer they
continued clearing part of the property, and began bulldozing and
filling some wet and uneven terrain. lOo In August 1978 they resumed work on the road, continuing uphill, across Parcel C and
back around almost to Parcel B in a wide loop on Parcel C. lOl (See
Figure 1.)
During this time Mr. Voss argued with Mr. Brown about the
location of the easement across Parcel A and about trespassing by
Mr. Brown and his contractors, both through their use of a wider
easement than the Browns owned and their use of a triangular
piece of Parcel A, adjacent to. the northwest comer of the easement, for backing up and turning vehicles working on the Browns'
land. 102 In the spring of 1978 Mr. Voss had put up a chain link J
See Fig. 2, infra page 1481.
Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 9.
99 Trial Transcript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 59-60 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as
adverse witness); id. at 7-8, 154-55 (direct examination of Mr. Voss).
100 Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 9; Trial Transcript, supra note 48, pt.
II, at 61-62, 119, 128-30 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as adverse witness and direct
examination of Mr. Brown).
101 Trial Transcript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 7-8 (direct examination of Mr. Voss).
102 See, e.g., iii. at pt. I, 2, 6 (statements by Browns' lawyer); id. at pt. II, 9-27 (direct
examination of Mr. Voss); id. at pt. II, 75-76 (cross-examination of Mr. Brown as adverse
witness); id. at pt. II, 132-35 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
Mr. Brown confirmed in my conversation with him that before the Browns filed their
lawsuit, the continuing dispute over the easement was not about the Vosses preventing the
use of the easement but was instead over its exact location and over the trespass on the
triangular piece of Parcel A. Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94. The Browns' initial
complaint alleged that logs, a concrete sump, and a chain link fence ·had "prevent[ed] its
full use" and "severely restrict[ed] its continued use." Plaintiffs' Complaint at 2, BroWn v.
Voss, No. 14076 (Wash. Super. Ct., July 15, 1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App.
1984), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). In Mr. Brown's August affidavit, he stated, "We
are presently in dispute in this case as to the proper location of [the] easement." Plaintiff's
Affidavit, filed with Plaintiffs' Me!Dorandum in Opposition to Motion for Temporary Injunction at 4, Brown v. Voss, No. 14076 (Wash. Super. Ct., July 15, 1982), rev'd, 689' P.2d
1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rE!v'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). It was not asserted by the
Browns that the Vosses ever prevented them or th~ir workers from passing over the
easement.
At trial Mr. Brown testified that when his fill contractor conveyed Mr. Vosses' complaints about trespassing on Parcel A outside of the easement, "[I]t was in the wet season
of the year. I told [him] that, yes, we would remedy the situation, but that we would do it
at the proper time. He wasn't authorized by me to let him do it at his leisure, no." Trial
Transcript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 139 (cross-examination of Mr. Brown). The contractor
confirmed in his testimony that "Mr. Voss told me the road where it was supposed to be
that I had made it infringing or whatever at the Y, and I told him I would correct it, only
97

98
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fence lO3 that Mr. Brown claimed encroached on the easement by
running alongside and a couple of feet inside of its eastern edge. 104
Mr. Brown also complained that logs and a concrete sump pump
encroached upon the easement, although he did not allege that he
was ever unable to cross Parcel A.lOS That summer, in August, the
two men came to blows on Mr. Voss's property,l06 an event that
both men told me about but neither mentioned in the course of the
litigation. The following March, the Browns filed the suit against
the Vosses for interfering with the easement, and at the end of that
month, the Browns began construction of a building on Parcel B
set close to the lot line between Parcels A and B.107 The building
permit issued for the structure was for a utility buildip.g.108
When the Vosses filed their counterclaim in April, "it was
news to everybody," Mr. Brown told me, that the Vosses could
make a legal claim that the Browns did not have a right to use their
easement to benefit Parcel C. 109 Although Mr. Brown said in the
interview that he has now "put [the experience] in the past" and is
unwilling to discuss the matter in detail, he communicated in general terms his version of his story. no "My position was always that
I had an easement."ll1 In his view, his easement gave him access to
both parcels; once he passed onto one half of his property, Parcel
B, he then had a right to continue from there to the other half of
his property, Parcel C. 112 Mr. Voss failed to recognize this rightwhich was subsequently recognized in their "precedent-setting"
case-because Mr. Voss was "an extremely unreasonable person,
to the point of some mental problem. "113 In the litigation, the story
of the dispute communicated by the Browns' lawyer114 largely reMr. Brown told me that would come later." Id. pt. II, at 108 (direct examination of fill
contractor).103 ThaI 'franscript, supra !1ote 48, pt. II, at 10 (direct examination of Mr. Voss).
104 Id. pt. II, at 92 (direct examination of Browns' surveyor).
105 See supra text accompanying note 102.
106 Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94; Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
107 ThaI 'franscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 11 (direct examination of Mr. Voss); itt. pt.
II, at 68 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as adverse witness); id. at pt. II, 120 (direct
examination of Mr. Brown).
108 Id. pt. II, at 68 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as adverse witness) (testifying that
they started a utility shed and "later got permission to put temporary living quarters in it");
see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
109 Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 I refer to the Browns' and the Vosses' lawyers simply as their lawyers, rather than by
name, with the fact in mind that I have strictly limited my task to analyzing their roles as
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flected Mr. Brown's own view, and Mr. Brown believes that his
situation was well represented. 115 In the metaphor of lawyering as
translation, Mr. Brown believes that their lawyer conveyed an accurate translation of his story.116 The central theme of his lawyer's
story was that it is a pointless property law reification to view property assembled by a single owner into one parcel as two distinct
parcels-one with access via the easement and one without. As a
common sense matter, the fact that the house would simply straddle what had been the boundary between two lots, rather than being located solely on one lot, itself demonstrates the absurdity of a
rule that would allow access over the easement to one half of the
house but not to the other. 117 Using the easement to benefit a single family house built on two lots instead of one is a reasonable use
that would not increase the burden on the servient estate. A property owner naturally expects and ought to be able to do what he
wants with his own property-in Mr. Brown's case to build his and
his wife's "dream home."118 Mr. Brown had already made a considerable investment relying on the use of the easement to benefit
both parcels. While Mr. Brown made this investment, Mr. Voss
stood by and did not object. If an injunction were granted, the
Browns would not have access to their property. The fact that Mr.
Voss seeks an injunction under these circumstances shows he is a
difficult person, unreasonably seeking to frustrate their reasonable
plans.
In translating Mr. Brown's story, as described below, the
Browns' lawyer adopted a sort of "anti-narrative" narrative strategy. By skillfully selecting from among the facts about relations
between the neighbors, he presented a general, decontextualized
story that was ultimately reflected in the supreme court of Washington's opinion and that invited the story's audience to conclude
that Mr. Voss must have been acting in an unreasonable, unneighborly wayy9 At the same time he both insisted on the irrelerepresentatives in this particular case, as those roles can be divined from the infonnation in
public records and from my interviews with Mr. Brown and Mr. Voss. I do not mean to
critique them generally as lawyers, and I have not solicited their recollections of events.
115 Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94.
116 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
Mr. Brown, in the telephone interview conducted fifteen years after he filed the lawsuit, characterized the operation of the rule in exactly this way. It would make no sense, he
told me, to have a rule that would allow him to use one part of his house and not another.
Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94.
118 Plaintiffs' 'frial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3: "Their present plans are to begin
construction of their 'dream home' later in 1980."
119 See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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vancy of evidence about relations between the neighbors and
suggested that Mr. Voss's objections, because there was no reason
for them, grew out of irrational spiteful feelings. 12o With respect
to the law, the applicable legal rules did not fit well with this factual account. In his doctrinal narrative, therefore, he omitted a key
legal distinction and recast the law to fit his factual account. 121
In pursuing these narrative strategies, the Browns' lawyer was
aided by the Vosses' lawyer's primary reliance on the established
common law rule and his concomitant failure, discussed below and
in the next Part, either to effectively refute the Browns' story or to
present a compelling competing story .122 Most strikingly, the
Browns' lawyer benefitted on appeal from the trial court's inaccurate finding, unchallenged by the Vosses' lawyer, that Parcel C
would be landlocked witho,ut access via the easement. 123
The Browns' lawyer began his opening statement at trial by
relegating any discussion of the law to his Trial Memorandum,124
but then assailing the property law reificationof Parcels Band C
into two separate entities. In the service of a kind of re-reification
of their property from two legal entities into one, he maintained at
trial that "there now is a unity of title, and common ownership of
the entire parcel here,"125 a point emphasized in his Trial Memorandum. 126 In a colloquy before his opening statement, he atSee infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 225-31, 271-305 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
Trial Transcript, supra note 48, pt. I, at 7: "With regard to ... their claim that we
cannot use the easement to get to [Parcel C), we have a significant amount of law we will
want to argue, and I will set forth in my brief, but factually . ... " (emphasis added).
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
In an earlier filing in the case, the Browns' lawyer had explained that the "Browns
have acquired two parcels of property which are now joined as one." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Temporary Injunction, supra note 102, at 3 (five months
after Browns filed suit, Vosses filed motion for temporary injunction, which was denied).
126 The Browns' lawyer stated:
The defendants continually want to segregate those two parcels, and there is no
reason to do so. . . . Mr. and Mrs. Brown do not drive across the easement to
get to the Rylander parcel as alleged by the defendants: [t]hey drive across the
easement to get to their property. The Rylander and Christensen parcels have
merged. The Browns have a right to an easement to have access to their
property.
Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 5-6.
The Browns' lawyer continued to pursue this notion in the two appeals of the case.
He informed both the Court of Appeals of Washington and the Supreme Court of Washington that "Parcel C was a contiguous piece of property to Parcel B, and gave Brown a
single ownership of a larger tract of land." Brief of Respondents at 4, Brown v. Voss, 689
P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (No. 06490-1), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986); Petition
for Review at 3, Brown v. Voss, 71S P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986) (No. 51283-3).
125
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tempted to represent the two lots as being essentially the same size.
The Vosses' lawyer had prepared a "not-to-scale" sketch of the
claimed "comer-cutting" trespass on a triangular piece of Parcel
A.127 The Browns' lawyer pointed out that the sketch was not
illustrative ... because it does not show the size of the parcels,
and if this is meant to imply there is a small Christ[ensen] parcel
[(Parcel B)], and we are attempting to get a large Rylander parcel [(Parcel C)], the Court will find that that isn't the case, that
these are, essentially, equivalent pieces of real estate. 128
As Mr. Brown testified, however, when examined as an adverse
witness, Parcel C is substantially larger in area than Parcel B. Mr.
Brown testified that Parcel B is approximately 2.3 acres, and that
the two parcels together include approximately eight acres of
land. 129 Calculating from these estimates, Parcel C is two and a
half times larger than Parcel B.130
Rhetorically, the Browns' lawyer referred to Parcel B as "the
Christensen parcel," which enjoys access via the easement, while
referring several times to Parcel C as "the so-called Rylander parcel."131 Mr. Brown himself repeatedly stated at trial, and the
Browns' lawyer repeatedly elicited statements, that the Browns
and others thought of Parcels Band C as a single piece of property.
For.example, Mr. Brown volunteered during his direct examination
as an adverse witness, when the Vosses' lawyer had referred to the
"Christensen tract" and the "Rylander tract": "It's all one piece of
property to us. We don't refer to it as the Christensen and Rylander tract."132 On direct examination by his lawyer, Mr. Brown
was asked, "[H]ave you ever been concerned about the location of
the boundary line between Band C since you purchased the Rylander property?" Mr. Brown answered, "No." His lawyer contin127

Thai 1i"anscript, supra note 48, pt. I, at 4·5.
ld. pt. I, at 5-6. The Browns' lawyer may not have been well acquainted with the
Browns' property. There is no view of Mount Rainier from the property, but at trial he
and Mr. Brown engaged in the following exchange:
Q: By view, what do you mean?
A: View of the canal and tidelands with the property.
Q: A beautiful view of Mt. Rainier also?
A: Not really, ... no.
ld. pt. II, at 114 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
129 ld. pt. II, at 70-71 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as adverse witness).
130 The Mason County Auditor's office records of transfers of the parcels indicate that
Parcel A is 1.77 acres, Parcel B is 1.4 acres, and Parcel C is 5.05 acres. Using these figures,
Parcels Band C together are 6.45 acres, and Parcel C is approximately three and a half
times larger than Parcel B.
131 Thal1i"anscript, supra note 48, pt. I, at 7, 9 (opening colloquy with the court); pt. II,
at 48 (cross-examining Mr. Voss).
132 Id. pt. II, at 59-60 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as adverse witness).
128
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ued, "You always considered it entirely your property?" "Yes, we
didn't even bother with that line on the survey.,,133 When the
Browns' surveyor testified, he was asked by the Browns' lawyer,
"For your purposes, was there any reason to segregate [the
Browns' property into Parcels] Band C?" He answered: "No,
there was no purpose to segregate it. "134
Presumably to stress this pointless reification of viewing Parcels Band C as two separate entities, the Browns' lawyer told the
trial court at the outset that "our facts [will] show we intend to
build a home that will go across the imaginary line of what was the
line between the Rylander and [Christensen] property."135 He had
explained in his Trial Memorandum the Vosses' impliedly absurd
position that if a home were built on the "imaginary line," then
"the Browns can enter the home on the southside, or former Christensen portion of the property [Parcel B], but they' cannot walk
into the northern part of that house which would lie on the former
Rylander portion [Parcel C]."136 At trial, it was the Vosses' lawyer
who elicited Mr. Brown's testimony that the house would "straddle
where the old line was between the parcels." But when Mr. Brown
133

Id. pt. II, at 116 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
When the Vosses' lawyer asked whether he was aware that he had no easement access
to the "Rylander property," Mr. Brown responded. "We do have easements; it is aJl one
common piece of property. It has been our contention from the very beginning, and there
is no question in my mind." Id. pt. II, at 61 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as adverse
witness). Again in response to a reference to the "Rylander tract": "I don't consider it the
Rylander tract; it is just one piece." Id. pt. II, at 71 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as
adverse witness).
134 Id. pt. II, at 80.
Similarly, the Browns' lawyer inquired of the contractor who was moving fiJI dirt for
the Browns:
Q: Were you ever informed or did you know there was some sort of a line or
separation between two parcels here when you were working on the Brown's
property?
A: No, not when Brown was [the owner of the properties].
Q: It was aJl one parcel of property as far as you were concerned?
A: Yes.
Id. pt. II, at 107-08.
135 Id. pt. I, at 12 (emphasis added).
136 Plaintiffs' 1tial MemorandUm, supra note 23, at 3.
The Browns' lawyer similarly told the judge at the beginning of the trial that,
Even if we do build on the [Christensen] property [Parcel B], we have no access
to the so-caJled Rylander property [Parcel C), even if we want to walk out of
the house and stand out on the bluff and watch the sunrise; we can't go over on
that Rylander property. That is the position they indicated to us they are taking ....
1tial 1tanscript, supra note 48, pt. I, at 12.
He told the same story to both appeJlate courts. Brief of Respondents, supra note
126, at 7; Petition for Review, supra note 126, at 3.
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was then asked whether the house, if not "just down the middle" of
the line, would be located "pretty close" to that, he responded
somewhat equivocally, "No, maybe yes, yes and no; we haven't located it exactly."137
The Browns' lawyer maintained at trial that the particulars of
the poor relations between the neighbors were not relevant to the
case. He objected when the Vosses' lawyer asked Mr. Voss about
the men's first meeting. Mr. Voss answered: "I was invited in there
to talk things over, meet him, howsoever[,] [a]lmost the first blast 1
got out of Mr. Brown was the fact that-how do 1 phrase it-my
nephew sat on his grass a few days before and he didn't like
that."138 The Browns' lawyer argued, "Obviously, there is a problem between these neighbors or we wouldn't be here in the courtroom. If we are going to start through each name-calling, each
mud-slinging that has been going on for the last couple of years ...
we will be here for a long time on issues not relevant to the
case. "139 With the trial court in basic agreement, the Vosses' lawyer went along: "Yes, Your Honor, the more we leave personalities
out of it, the better."14o The Browns' lawyer had argued, however,
in his Trial Memorandum that there was no reason for issuing an
injunction against the Browns "except for a claimed technical legal
interpretation of an old rule for spiteful purposes. The court
should not be used for such a result. "141
At trial, the Browns' lawyer argued successfully that evidence
that none of the owners of the servient parcels to the south of Mr.
Voss had complained about the Browns' use of the easement to
benefit Parcel C was relevant to determining whether there had
137 lHal Transcript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 69 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as
adverse witness). The Browns' lawyer did not elicit any testimony at trial about the
planned location of the house. He asked Mr. Brown a single question during his redirect
examination:
Q: Do you know, as of today, Mr. Brown, the exact location of where your
house is going to be?
A: The exact location[,] I do not.
[d. pt. II, at 141 (redirect examination of Mr. Brown).
138 [d. pt. I, at 5 (direct examination of Mr. Voss). Mr. Brown denied that this had
occurred, id. pt. II, at 76-77 (cross-examination of Mr. Brown as an adverse witness). Mr.
Voss described the conversation to me in greater detail when I interviewed him, see infra
note 198 and accompanying text.
139 1i'ial 1i'anscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 5-6.
140 [d. pt. II, at 6. The Vosses' lawyer said that he did not "propose to do that," to go
through "each name-calling." [d.
141 Plaintiffs'lHal Memorandum, supra note 23, at 8-9. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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been "excessive or unreasonable use" of the easement. 142 Such evidence also comported with his story that because there was no
reason for Mr. Voss to object, he must be acting irrationally. The
Browns' lawyer also suggested ill-tempered and obsessive behavior
on Mr. Voss's part with questions such as, "Do you have a practice
of stopping [people going onto the Browns' property] and harassing them?"143 and, "Would you say when you [had a discussion
with the Browns' fill contractor] you raised your voice?"l44 During
questioning later about the location and size of the easement, he
asked Mr. Voss, "[W]hy was it necessary to go out and make that
measurement 40 or 50 separate times?"145- an exchange echoed
later by Mr. Brown's remark, "I'm a busy man, I have better things
to do than to keep track of trivial things as Voss does. "146
With respect to Mr. Voss's knowledge and conduct while the
Browns were preparing their property for building the habitable
utility building, and later the single-family house, the Browns' lawyer asserted at the beginning of the trial that the Browns "made
known their intentions to the Defendants Voss of building a home
in that area."147 The Vosses "observed [clearing, fill dirt moving,
and road building] and knew that, in fact, my clients were going to
be building a home there. "148 In her direct examination by the
Browns' lawyer, however, Mrs. Brown testified that she and her
husband did not communicate any "specific plans [about] what
[they] were going to build or where it would be located," but that
they did "tell them generally, [their] purpose in buying this property and becoming their neighbor would be to build a home. "149
The Browns' lawyer asked Mr. Brown whether he had any conver142 The Browns' lawyer was responding to the Vosses' lawyer's objection to the question
put to Mr. Brown: "Have you had a single complaint from any other of the property owners whose property you crossed in your use of the property?" The Browns' lawyer failed to
pose the question again to Mr. Brown, after the judge overruled the objection on the
ground that the evidence would be relevant "as far as any excessive or unreasonable use, at
least in the eyes of the other persons that live adjacent to the subject easement." It appears from the transcript, however, as if the impression was created, at least, that Mr.
Brown knew of no such complaints. 1fial 1fanscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 74-75 (during
cross-examination of Mr. Brown as adverse witness).
143 Id. pt. II, at 44 (cross-examination of Mr. Voss).
144 Id.
145 Id. pt. II, at 47 (cross-examination of Mr. Voss) (about measurements taken by Mr.
Voss after the Browns filed suit).
146 Id. pt. II, at 138 (cross-examination of Mr. Brown).
147 Id. pt. I, at 7.
148 Id. pt. I, at 8.
149 Id. pt. II, at 143 (direct examination of Mrs. Brown).
Q: Did you have any conversations with the Voss[es] in 1977 telling them
about your plans to build a home?
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sations with Mr. Voss in 1977 "in which you told him what your
future plans were with regard to building a home up there [on Parcel C]?" Mr. Brown answered, "There was some discussion. I have
never had very much discussion with Mr. Voss, but there was no
discussion about homes going up there. "150
FoUowing up on Mr. Brown's response during cross-examination, the Vosses' lawyer elicited Mr. Brown's feeling that he should
not have to inform Mr. Voss about his plans.
Q: Did you ever sit down with Mr. Voss, at any time, and show
him exactly where you planned to build your new structure and
exactly where the property lines were?
A: [ ], 1 had no reason.
Q: Your answer is no?
A: It is my property.
Q: Your answer is no, you did not?
A: Why should I?
Q: 1 would appreciate your answering the question.
A: No, 1 did not. 151

Mr. Voss managed to assert during his cross-examination by the
Browns' lawyer that "their intentions were never made known to
me. I have no idea where they are going, what they are going to
build, and where they are going to build it ... ,"152 and that
"[o]fficiaUy ... I still don't know that they are going to" build a
home. 153 Thus the Browns' lawyer failed to demonstrate that the
Vosses knew about the Browns' plans in any detail, although the
Browns' lawyer did establish that Mr. Voss most probably never
denied permission to the Browns to use the easement to service
both Parcel B and Parcel C. 154
A: Well, just that we planned to build a home there, and that it would probably take awhile to develop it.
Q: Did you give them any specific plans of precisely what you were going to
build or where it would be located?
A: No.
Q: But you did tell them generally, your purpose in buying this property and
becoming their neighbor would be to build a home?
A: Yes.
Id.
Id. pt. II, at 136-37 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
Id. pt. II, at 140-41.
Id. pt. II, at 36. The Browns' lawyer had asked Mr. Voss whether the Browns would
have t6 add dirt fill where they wanted to build, as Mr. Voss had done. Id.
153 Id. pt. II, at 37. The Browns' lawyer had asked Mr. Voss, "When did you become
aware that the Browns were going to build a home?" Id.
154 Mrs. Brown answered "No, never," when asked by the Browns' lawyer, "Did they
raise any objection to you prior to [their] filing a [counterclaim] in this lawsuit to your
having access across the easement on their property to the northern portion of their prop150
151
152
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At the heart of the Browns' lawyer's story was the fact that the
Browns wanted to build only a single-family house on the property
line between Parcels Band C, a house that would be the same as a
house built entirely on Parcel B and that would therefore not create an additional burden on the easement. 1SS Both Mr. and Mrs.
Brown testified that their plan was to build a single-family
house. 1s6 The trial court revealed its receptivity to the Browns'
lawyer's factual and legal contentions when the judge said during
preliminary discussions with the lawyers:
I assume the use being sought by the Plaintiff[s] of the easement
is for the purpose of construction of a family residence, not a
duplex or a mUlti-purpose building on the premises and . . .
[that] you are asking that the Court find that by building that
residence in the area of the Christ[ensen] and Rylander property?" ld. pt. II, at 143 (direct examination of Mrs. Brown). Mr. Brown also testified that
Mr. Voss had not objected to this, although Mr. Voss had continually raised objections to
Mr. Brown's use of the easement:
Q: Did he ever tell you that he objected to your using the easement to go on
the northe~ part of your property, or the Rylander portion of it?
A: Not specifically that I can ever recall, no.
Q: Was there every anything like that said to you or any action taken by him
objecting to that until this [counterclaim] in this lawsuit was filed?
A: No, Mr. Voss made many allegations and so forth up there, which I made
no effort to keep particular track of, but specifically objecting to anything, I
would say probably that he objected to everything, but to the road building, no.
He was there the entire time the road was being built.
Q: Precisely, did he raise an objection to your using the easement across this
property in order to get to the northern part or the Rylander part [Parcel C] of
your property?
A: Not to me, no.
ld. pt. II, at 137 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
Mr. Voss testified that he never gave permission for the Browns to make any use they
wished of the easement, id. pt. II, at 29-30 (direct examination of Mr. Voss). He also
claimed at one point that he had objected as early as 1977, id. pt. II, at 39 (cross-examination of Mr. Voss), and in early 1978, id. pt. II, at 155 (cross-examination of Mr. Voss), to the
construction of the road from the easement through Parcel B and up into Parcel C, but he
conceded later that the road did not extend beyond Parcel B until late 1978. ld. (the
Browns' lawyer's questioning on this point confirmed that the Browns did not seek either
to inform the Vosses of their plans or to gain their permission).
1SS Plaintiffs' lIial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3, 5-6. The memorandum stated
that, "They plan to construct a single family dwelling. Their use of the easement to get to
their property is concededly not excessive, and not a burden on the easement." ld. at 3.
"As long as only a single family dwelling is being erected, there can be no additional burden on the easement, and no damage whatsoever to the defendants." ld. at 5-6; see also
Brief of Respondents, supra note 126, at 5; Petition for Review, supra note 126, at 13.
1S6 Thai 'franscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 39 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as
adverse witness); pt. II, at 114 (direct examination of Mr. Brown); pt. II, at 142 (direct
examination of Mrs. BroWn).
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erty, if it is part on one and part on the other, that there will be
no increase on the [burden on] the easement?157

The trial court noted further, "If [the Browns] would prevail, [they]
would prevail in connection with a single family residence, and if
[they] sought to put in a duplex, it would go beyond the terms of
the order."158 Indeed, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
later issued by the trial court specifically denied the "defendants'
request for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff from using the
easement for ingress and egress to parcel C for the construction and
use of a single family residence to be built partly on parcel Band
partly on parcel [C]."159
In fact, at the time of trial, two small houses stood on Parcel B,
although one was denominated a utility building and one was
slated for removal. 160 A third house, for which the Browns were
preparing their property, was to be larger than most of the houses
in the surrounding area. 161 The Vosses' lawyer asked Mr. Brown at
trial about the utility building: "When you go out there, do you live
in the utility shed now or live in the old Christensen structure?"
He responded, "Both, we utilize both buildings. "162 In an affidavit
filed earlier in the litigation, Mr. Brown had stated that a substantial amount of work had been done on the utility building:
The plumbing has been installed, the electricity has been installed and appliances are in. There is some drywall work to be
done; there is finish carpentry work to be done; there is carpeting to be put down; there is painting to be done. There is also
going to be a carport constructed adjacent to the utility
building. 163
The utility building, which still stands, is an attractive, partly twostory, bam-shaped structure the size of a small house. 164 The original Christensen house, which was razed by Mr. Voss after he acId. pt. I, at to.
Id. pt. I, at 11.
159 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 23, at 5 (emphasis added).
160 There may also have been on the property at that time both a "work shed" and a
"wood shed." ThaI 'ftanscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 116-17 (direct examination of Mr.
Brown) (smaller structures as well as the original house were present on the property
before clearing and filling began).
161 See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
162 ThaI 'ftanscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 68 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as
adverse witness).
163 Plaintiffs' Affidavit, supra note 102, at 2-3.
164 Observations of the author. I conducted my interview with Mr. Voss in this
structure.
157
158
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quired Parcel B, was a modest structure. 165 With respect to the size
of the single-family house planned by the Browns, the Browns'
lawyer asked Mr. Brown at trial if Parcel B alone would be "large
enough for what you wanted to db in building a home?" Mr.
Brown answered, "No.... The general intention was to create a
piece of property large enough to take advantage of our view and
enough room for the size home we are contemplating."166 Mr.
Brown testified that the house would "range from 2,000 to 4,000
[square] feet" in area. 167
The Browns' lawyer's story that a single-family house straddling two parcels would not burden the easement more than a single-family house on one of the parcels was bolstered by his
assertion, adopted by the trial court,168 that the Vosses had filed
their counterclaim solely for the purpose of gaining leverage in the
suit filed against them,169 an assertion that-coupled with the
165 Mr. Voss reported that it was a small and dilapidated house. Interview with Mr.
Voss, supra note 83.
166 Trial 'franscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 115.
167 Id. pt. II, at 59 (direct examination of Mr. Brown as adverse witness). This estimate,
in my observation of the area, would have made the house from somewhat larger to much
larger than most of the surrounding houses in this part of the western shore of the Hood
Canal.
168 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 23, at 4. The court stated: "the
defendants['] counterclaim seeking an injunction to bar plaintiffs['] access to [P]arcel C was
filed as leverage against the original plaintiffs' claim for an interruption of their easement
rights."
169 The Browns' lawyer pursued this assertion in the following exchange with Mr. Voss:
Q: After responding to our lawsuit, didn't you, in tum, yourself, file a lawsuit
against the Browns? The Browns only lawsuit was to stop you from putting a
sump and logs and your fence on the easement, wasn't it?
A: It's not clear to me.
Q: SO, you don't feel you are bringing a lawsuit against the Brown's [sic] to
stop them from having access to the north part of your property?
A: In the fact, sir, that we are using this as leverage for settlement of this
other thing, yes, I guess we are filing a lawsuit. However, he improved that
road or built that road through the Rylander property without any questions or
counsel with me, and he put it where he wanted it. He did it completely without any counselor consideration for my interests. I made objections just as
soon as I knew about it.
Q: SO, really you were disturbed about that, so you filed this action kind of as
a leverage to help resolve the issue, is that right?
A: Hope to, yes, sir.
Q: I guess you were unhappy Mr. Brown filed a lawsuit against you for encroaching on the easement?
A: Sir, in my estimation, that whole thing is fraud because I didn't put that
fence on the easement; it is as simple as that.
Q: And so you felt that maybe you could have enough leverage to file that?
A: I thought it would resolve easier if we went ahead and pressed our right to
have the Browns not trespass and to not have the Browns use that access road
for something other than that provided for in the easement document.
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Vosses' continued pursuit of their counterclaim-in tum supported
the story of Mr. Voss's unreasonable, unneighborly behavior. The
Browns' lawyer did not suggest that the court, whether or not it
found a misuse of the easement, should weigh the parties' relative
burdens with and without an injunction, and should find that the
Browns would suffer more harm from a grant of an injunction than
the Vosses would suffer from a denial. But he did make what he
called an "estoppel" argument in which he emphasized that the
Vosses should not succeed in their claim-made only after the
Browns had expended more than $7,500 on the property-that the
Browns "cannot have access to their property."170 (He did not
include in that expenditure figure the $12,000171 that the Browns
had paid for Parcel C. At trial, the Browns' lawyer presented evidence of all of their expenditures developing the property, both
before and after the Vosses filed their counterclaim.)l72
On the subject of the Browns' possible access to and use of
Parcel C without the easement, the Browns' lawyer's Trial Memorandum had asserted that "[i]t would be unconscionable to deny
[the Browns] the right to gain access to a portion of their property
as is claimed by the defendants."173 There was no actual testimony
at trial that there would be no access to Parcel C from a public
road without the easement. The Browns' lawyer did have Mr.
Brown explain how the Browns reached their property by turning
off Highway 101 onto a private road that passed through a number
of other parcels before passing through Parcel A.174 This private
road traverses the hill on which the three parcels and other parcels
to the south are located; it climbs uphill in a northwesterly direc1fial1fanscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 37-38. Given the imprecision of language and the
differing points of view of the examiner and the examined, they may have been speaking at
cross-purposes. As discussed in the next section, Mr. Voss may have been suggesting that
he was pursuing his counterclaim to attempt to resolve what he considered to be the underlying problem between himself and Mr. Brown.
170 Plaintiffs' 1fial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 9.
171 This is the sale price noted in the Mason County, Washington, Auditor's Office's
record on the parcel, and it is also reflected in the tax stamp on the deed from the
Rylanders.
172 1fial1fanscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 110-11, 130-32 (introduction of bills received
for work performed on the property).
If Parcel C would be landlocked without access via the easement, it would seem that
the Browns either would incur the cost, whatever that might be, of purchasing and developing alternate access or would lose the entire value of Parcel C, as well as some part of
their investment in developing the "double lot."
173 Plaintiffs' 1fial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 5.
174 1fial1fanscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 73 (cross-examination of Brown as adverse
witness).
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tion, passing on the Vosses' property behind their houseps The
Browns' lawyer also asked both of the Browns if they would have
purchased Parcels Band C "[i]f [they] had known that [they]
weren't going to have any access to the northern part of [their]
property,"176 or "[i]f [they] had known that there would be any
problem in having access to the northern portion ... ?"177 Mr.
Brown testified that he would not have done construction work on
the utility building in the same location: "[T]he entire layout of the
property would be different, even if we, in fact, ever bought it."178
Mrs. Brown testified that they would not have purchased the property: "No ... we are not that rich, and it has been just too costly,
and we wouldn't have had we known we couldn't build there or use
it."179 Their responses were consistent with the fact that the easement was the only developed access to the part of their property
that they were developing. 180
The trial judge had suggested that he understood Parcel C
would be landlocked without access via the easement,l81 and he
subsequently stated in his Findings of Facts. and Conclusions of
Law that if an injunction were granted barring "access to [Parcel] C
across the easement to a single family residence, Parcel C would
become landlocked; plaintiffs would not be able to make any use of
their property .... "182 The simplified representation used at trial
See Fig. 1, supra page 1455.
Trial 'franscript, supra note 48, at pt. II, 136 (emphasis added).
177 Id. pt. II, at 143.
178 Id. pt. II, at 136.
179 Id. pt. II, at 143-44.
180 Mr. Voss testified at one point, in response to questioning by his lawyer, that Mr.
Brown could not only have brought a trailer to the upper portion of the Browns' property
over the easement, but that he could have also driven a tractor up from the highway across
the Browns' property. Id. pt. II, at 51-52.
181 The trial judge noted at the beginning of the trial that if the Vosses prevailed,
"[t]hen, the next lawsuit would be a lawsuit for a way of necessity." [d. pt. T, at 13. Under
Washington law, a private condemnation action to create a right of way is possible if such a
right of way is reasonably necessary. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
182 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 23, at 3-4. At trial, the judge
announced that he would view the property before issuing a decision, 1lial 'franscript,
supra note 48, at pt. I, 13, and in the opinion he noted that he had viewed the property:
Order and Judgment at 1, Brown v. Voss, No. 14076 (Wash. Super. Ct., July 15, 1982),
rev'd, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). Perhaps he
meant by the term "landlocked" that the property would lack developed access. In property law, however, the term is used to mean that "a piece of land belonging to one person
[is] surrounded by land belonging to other persons, so that it cannot be approached except
over their land. Access to such land will normally be via an easement from surrounding
landowner." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 818 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., CuNNINGHAM ET
AL., supra note 18, § 8.5; BOYER ET AL., supra note 18, at 361.
It was a different judge who, in December 1979, denied the Vosses' motion, filed in
August 1979, for a temporary injunction. Order Denying Temporary Injunction, supra
175

176

1480

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1445

and ultimately published with the opinion, Figure 1, seems to confirm this understanding because it shows only Parcels A through C
and because it omits the small tideland slivers of these parcels that
actually lie to the east of State Highway 101, along the Hood Canal. The representation therefore gives the impression that the
nearest public road lies somewhere south of Parcel A and is accessible to all three parcels only via the private road that comes up
from the highway and passes through the parcels lying to the
south. l83
The more complete representation in Figure 2 below shows
that State Highway 101 runs straight through the foot, or the eastern end, of all three parcels; it passes along the bank of the canal
and over easements for the highway established on each of the
three parcels. l84 Relying perhaps on the impression conveyed by
the representation, as well as the statement in the trial court's opinion, the Browns' lawyer did refer several times in papers filed in
both of the appeals to the fact that Parcel C would be landlocked
without access via the easement. l8S
With respect to the Browns' lawyer's doctrinal narrative, the
common law rule, of course, did not support the contention that
the Browns had a right to use the easement for access to Parcel C
as well as Parcel B. l 86 At the trial level he omitted the legal disnote 47, at 1. Mr. Voss's affidavit, filed with the Vosses' motion, referred to the easement
as "the only developed access at present" to Parcel C. Defendants' Motion for Temporary
Injunction at 2, Brown v. Voss, No. 14076 (Wash. Super. Ct., July 15, 1982), rev'd, 689 P.2d
1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). Mr. Brown stated in his
affidavit, filed in response, that the easement "is the only access to our property. Should
the court enter an injunction denying us the use of that roadway we would be landlocked."
Plaintiffs' Affidavit, supra note 102, at 4.
183 This was my own impression and I found in a survey of more than sixty students in
my spring 1994 first-year property course that this was also the impression of all but one
.student. On re-inspection of Figure I, one sees the line and the notation "S.R. [State
Route] 101." Perhaps this cryptic notation is cognitively "trumped" for most readers by
the textual assertion that Parcel C would be landlocked without access via the easement.
The effect may be somewhat analogous to an experiment in which a subject is presented
with a list of words for different colors. Each word is printed in a color different than the
color named by the word. The subject is asked to read off the colors in which the words
are printed, rather than the words themselves, a task that proves difficult. BARRY H.
KANTOWITZ ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 199-208 (5th ed. 1994).
184 An easement for the highway is described in the deed to each piece of property:
Deed from Virginia C. Debard to Fred R. Voss and Hattie G. Voss, recorded May 8, 1973;
Deed from Alphilde A. Christensen to Will H. Brown and Jean M. Brown, recorded Apr.
I, 1977; Deed from Clanton Rylander, Jr., and Lillian P. Rylander to Will H. Brown and
Jean M. Brown, recorded Aug. 29, 1977.
185 Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration at I, Brown v. Voss, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash.
a. App. 1984) (No. 6490-1-11), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986); Petition for Review,
supra note 126, at 2, 3, 17.
186 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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Highway 101

FIGURE 2. This drawing is an isometric composite based on: survey
maps on file at the Mason County, Washington, Auditor's Office; a plaintiffs exhibit admitted into evidence at trial, a surveyor's drawing which
shows the location of the easement on Parcel A; the drawing published in
the Supreme Court of Washington's opinion, 715 P.2d at 515, and reproduced here in Figure 2, which roughly approximates the location of the
road or driveway constructed by the Browns on Parcels B and C. The
path the road or driveway follows from Parcel A down through the lots
lying to the south, and out to the highway, is a rough approximation
based on the author's observation. The drawing was created by Stephen
Greene of the Institute for Language, Technology, and Publications Design at the University of Baltimore.

tinction between cases involving changes in the use of easements to
benefit the original dominant estate and cases involving the use of
an easement to benefit non-dominant property. He argued solely
in terms of the former cases, under which easements may be "put
to all reasonable use" and "used in the reasonable development of
the dominant estate."I87 The Browns' use of the easement to ac187 Plaintiffs' 1fial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3-5. "Washington law is not greatly
developed in this area. Reference to other sources shows that generally the court is guided
by a rule of reasonableness." [d. at 3.
The Browns' lawyer made unsuccessful attempts to distinguish cases that had been
cited by the Vosses in their cross-complaint as authority for the rule that an easement may
not be used to benefit property other than the original dominant estate. See id. at 6·8 (and
cases cited therein). For example, he "distinguished" one case because it concerned an
easement that arose by implication rather than an express easement. [d. at 6; see Defend·
ants' Memorandum of Authorities, supra note 23, at 4·8 (and cases cited therein).
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cess their enlarged Parcel B was reasonable and did not increase
the burden on the servient estate; therefore, he concluded, it would
be "unconscionable" to deny them a right to use the easement to
access Parcel C,188 The Browns' lawyer also argued that as an equitable matter the Vosses, who had not "show[ed] any damage,"
should be estopped from making their claim because they had not
asserted the claim until after the Browns had spent more than
$7,500 on their property.189 Of course, he technically did not convince the trial court that the Browns had a legal right to use the
easement to benefit Parcel C, But his story did persuade the trial
court, to the same effect, that the requested injunction should not
issue.
At the appellate levels, the Browns' lawyer revised his doctrinal narrative, acknowledging case law holding that easements may
not be used to benefit non dominant property, but characterizing it
as always involving situations in which, unlike the instant case, the
use of the easement to benefit nondominant property did create an
additional burden on the servient estate. 190 If there is a misuse, he
added at both appellate levels, it is "nothing more than a technical
misuse. "191 Although neither appellate court agreed that there was
no misuse,192 the supreme court of Washington did agree that the
188

Plaintiffs' 1tial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 5, 8.
Id. at 9. The only authority presented in support of this argument was as follows:
"The general principles of estoppel and waiver are set forth in Voelker v. Joseph, 62 Wash.
2d 429 (1963) although the facts of that case are not applicable in the instant case. Numerous cases in Washington, however, support the principle of the application of estoppel in
instances such as this." Id.
The Browns' lawyer also made an unfounded argument that the Vosses' claim should
be barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because another judge
had denied their motion for a temporary restraining order, and "[a]1I of the evidence that
will be heard at the time of trial was presented at that time by affidavits," and "[a]1I of the
law that is being argued now was presented ... at that time." Id. at 10. See rebuttal of
these assertions in Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities, supra note 23, at 9-10.
190 Brief of Respondents, supra note 126, at 10-15; Petition for Review, supra note 126,
at 10-15.
The Browns' lawyer also argued that an injunction prohibiting the Browns from using
the easement to access Parcel C while allowing them to access Parcel B would be difficult
to enforce "as [Mr.] Brown would be technically violating the injunction if he drove his
vehicle across the easement to Parcel B and then got out and walked onto Parcel C to view
the Hood Canal." Brief of Respondents, supra note 126, at 17-18.
191 Brief of Respondents, supra note 126, at 8; Petition for Review, supra note 126, at
10. At the trial level, the Browns' lawyer had noted, in concluding that the use of the
easement was reasonable and lawful, that "[t]here is no reason to enter the type of injunction that they are requesting, except for a claimed technical legal interpretation of an old
rule for spiteful purposes." Plaintiffs' 1tial Memorandum, supra note 23, at 8-9.
192 Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 517 (Wash. 1986); Brown v. Voss, 689 P.2d 1111, 1113
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
189
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Browns' use and planned use were "perhaps no more than technical misuse of the easement. '>193
B. Mr. Voss's Stories
When I visited Mr. Voss on his property, he talked at length
with me about the case. Like Mr. Brown, Mr. Voss is still troubled
by the memory of the litigation, but unlike Mr. Brown, Mr. Voss
feels as if he "never had a chance to tell [his] story."194 The Vosses'
involvement with the property on the Hood Canal began in 1973
when they bought Parcel A.195 They began constructing their
house in 1974 and were still finishing it at the time of trial in
1980. 196 Mr. Voss did much of the work on their house, contracting
out jobs he could not do himself.197 His first, unpropitious contact
with Mr. Brown was in 1977, a number of weeks after the Browns
purchased Parcel B. The Vosses had recently· hosted a family picnic on their property during which Mr. Voss's nephew and grandnephew had sat on a blanket over the line between Parcels A and
B. This was the trespass that Mr. Voss said Mr. Brown complained
of at their first meeting. 19B
Beginning with that first l'Il:eeting, in Mr. Voss's account, Mr.
Brown's conduct was unneighborly: Mr. Brown consistently failed
193
194

Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d at 517.
Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83. I telephoned Mr. Voss from close by to ask
if I could speak with him about the lawsuit and to ask if I could see the property. He
agreed and we met on his property for a couple of hours. Mr. Voss reported that he was
retired from a career in the military and as a civilian employee of the military; he had most
recently served for many years as an air traffic controller at a military airport. Id.
The first two things Mr. Voss said to me, after I pulled off of the. disputed easement
and got out of my rented car, were that he had "won in the end" and that he "never had a
.
chance to tell [his] story." Id.
His frustration at not being able to tell his story also emerges in the trial transcript. At
one point during his direct examination, he testified, "[t]here were several occasions, yes, I
tried to make it known to Mr. Brown that I didn't appreciate what was going on." Then he
appealed to the judge, "Could I explain it, sir?" The judge responded that the court would
not participate: "It's not up to the Court, Mr. Voss. There are two lawyers, and it is your
own counsel making the inquiry." 1i'ial 1i'anscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 29. Later the
Browns' lawyer asked, "You don't know whether they trespassed. It is just you are unhappy they went up that road and he built that road without consulting you in the first
place, isn't that the essence of it?" Mr. Voss appealed to him, "What latitude do I have to
make a statement, sir?" The Browns' lawyer Iimit~d his response: "I would like you to
answer my question, please." Id. pt. II, at 50.
195 Deed from Virginia C. Debard to Fred R. Voss and Hattie G. Voss, recorded May 3,
1973; 'frial 1i'anscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at.2 (direct examination of Mr. Voss).
196 'frial 1i'anscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 36 (cross-examination of Mr. Voss).
197 Id.; Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
198 Mr. Voss also told me he supposed Mr. Brown "couldn't be all bad" because he had
offered Mr. Voss a beer at their first meeting. Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
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to inform Mr. Voss about or consult with him about any of the
Browns' plans. Mr. Brown's own view of his rights and the testimony of the parties at trial, as described in the section above, confirms that Mr. Brown did not inform the Vosses with any specificity
about the Browns' plans and that he did not feel obliged to inform
them. 199 When Mr. Brown began the work on the new road, Mr.
Voss reported that he had "said nothing about it" to the Vosses. 2oo
As Mr. Voss complained in his testimony at trial, Mr. Brown "improved that road or built that road through the Rylander property
without any questions or counsel with me, and he put it where he
wanted it. He did it completely without any counselor consideration for my interests."201 The Browns' lawyer supported Mr. Voss's
story when he dismissively cross-examined him: "It is just you are
unhappy they went up that road and he built that road without
consulting you in the first place, isn't that the essence of it?"202
When the Browns later began work on the utility building, shortly
after they filed the lawsuit, Mr. Voss said he had to look up the
building permit to try to figure out what sort of structure the
Browns were constructing just over his property line. 203
In Mr. Voss's view of his own conduct, he was trying to be a
good neighbor. As he reminisced about the events of 1977 and
1978, he gave the impression that he was distressed that Mr. Brown
rejected his assistance. Asked at trial by the Browns' lawyer
whether he had stopped people coming across the easement and
harassed them, Mr. Voss said of the period before he and Mr.
Brown came to blows,
I have some interest in who is using the access road, and you
know I think up until August 8, 1978, I had some interest in kind
of protecting the Brown property. I did it because it was a
neighborly sort of thing, you know. I didn't mean any malice
toward anybody; I didn't harass anybody?04

When a workman first came to work on the existing house on Parcel B, Mr. Voss said, he lent him tools, pipe, and sheetrock. "The
man asked me not to tell Will [Brown]; said he won't like it very
much."205 Similarly, Mr. Voss indicated he had hoped to give Mr.
See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
Thai 'franscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 37 (cross-examination of Mr. Voss).
Id. pt. II, at 50 (cross-examination of Mr. Voss).
203 Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83. The building was permitted as a "workshop," he said. Id. As described in the section above, however, it was built and used as a
dwelling. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
204 Trial 'franscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 44-45.
205 Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
199
200
201
202
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Brown advice. On all of these properties water is very much a
common enemy,206 he said, and he had developed considerable expertise dealing with this problem. He told me he was disappointed
that Mr. Brown did not want his counsel on the subject. 207
Mr. Voss also said he was offended when Mr. Brown, in the
fall of 1977, invited him to walk the comers of the Browns' property with a surveyor, and then made clear to him when they all met
that he was only to listen and not to talk with either Mr. Brown or
the surveyor.208 Mr. Brown's trial testimony shows that he had
hoped to deal with Mr. Voss's concerns not by trying to talk with
him, but instead by hiring a surveyor to delineate the location and
width of the right of way.209 Mr. Voss's frustration with what he
viewed as this unneighborly conduct may have been what led him
to testify, when asked whether he also had had a survey done,
"What value is a survey? It puts a few lines on a piece of paper and
it doesn't say anything to anybody. Will Brown doesn't know
where he is yet. "210
It may have been Mr. Voss's desire for Mr. Brown to acknowledge and express respect for the Vosses' rights and interests in
their property that motivated his complaints about the Browns enlarging the easement and trespassing on an additional triangular
piece of ground. And it may have been this desire that later motivated him to pursue at trial and on appeal his counterclaim regarding the use of the easement to benefit Parcel C. The arguments
between the two men about the location and width of the easement
and the trespass on a triangular piece of Parcel A led to their physi206 See '"ftial '"ftanscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 128 (Mr. Brown testified that eight
springs drain from above his building site) (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
Mr. Voss said that Mr. Brown had disturbed a streambed in the course of the work on
his property, diverting water into the Vosses' carport, but had said "no word" about it to
Mr. Voss. Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
207 Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
208 [d.
209 Mr. Brown testified that he had a surveyor locate a line for the western edge of the
easement at a distance of 16 feet, the width specified in the grant of the easement, from the
Vosses' encroaching fence, in order to "get the easement thing settled without any further
problem with the neighbors." '"ftial '"ftanscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 133 (direct examination of Mr. Brown). When asked whether he did "something affirmatively" to avoid trespassing on Parcel A, Mr. Brown answered,
Yes, I'm the only one that spent any money up there to define any of the
boundaries on everything, and we, in fact, had the surveyor come up and show
us precisely where the line was[,] so it could only be done by a licensed surveyor, and move that post down to eliminate that further trespass.
[d. pt. II, at 135.
210 [d. pt. II, at 41 (cross-examination of Mr. Voss).
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cal confrontation in August 1978. 211 Mr. Brown said Mr. Voss assaulted him,212 and Mr. Voss said Mr. Brown, who was in his late
thirties and some fifteen years younger than Mr. Voss, knocked
him down and threatened him: "If you ever touch me again, I'll put
you under."213 Mr. Voss also said that he tried unsuccessfully to
have Mr. Brown prosecuted for threatening him214 and that he received a letter later in the month from the Browns' lawyer threatening legal action against him.215
It is a more difficult and delicate job to assess Mr. Voss's story
than it is to assess Mr. Brown's. From my brief conversations with
neighbors of Mr. Voss, my observation of Mr. Voss's property, and
my conversation with Mr. Voss, it appeared that he is extremely
sensitive to trespasses. His property was prominently posted. His
neighbors said that he had fired shots in the air to chase young
trespassers away from the tideland and that he was rumored to
have scared off a potential buyer of Parcel B from Mrs. Christensen after the Browns lost the property in her forfeiture action. 216
211
212
213

Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94; Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94.
Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
214 [d. Mr. Voss said that he went to the sheriff's office to make a statement and later
took in a statement by his wife, but that the sheriff did not visit the property until later in
the month, after Mr. Brown had departed for the season. Mr. Voss said that the prosecutor
to whom the matter was referred got a statement from a witness, Mr. Brown's fill contractor, a statement that the prosecutor said "[didn't] look so good" for prosecuting Mr.
Brown. Mr. Voss said that the contractor's view of the two men was blocked by the open
door of Mr. Brown's truck. [d.
215 Id. The Browns filed their lawsuit the following March.
216 Even if Mr. Voss had discouraged a potential buyer, he does not appear to have
acted unfairly or unsympathetically in the process of purchasing Parcel C from Mrs. Christensen, his foniler neighbor. In the installment land contract Mrs. Christensen had entered
into with the Browns in 1977, the purchase price was stated to be $29,500, with a down
payment of $7,000, monthly payments of $215.03, and "interest on the declining balance at
the rate of 8% per annum ... which interest will be deducted from each payment and the
balance applied on principal." Real Estate Contract, dated Apr. 1, 1977, recorded in the
Mason County, Washington, Auditor's Office. In November 1983 the Browns had ceased
making payments, and in January 1986 a default judgment had been entered against them.
See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
In May 1986, the Vosses paid Mrs. Christensen $36,000 in cash for the improved Parcel
B, plus approximately $2,300 in unpaid taxes. Mason County, Washington, Auditor's Office tax records; Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83. Mr. Voss told me that this transaction enabled Mrs. Christensen, who was living in straitened circumstances, to buy her first
new car. Id. His account was supported by Mrs. Christensen's pleadings in the forfeiture
and quiet title action against the Browns, in which her attorney stated in an affidavit in a
Motion for Summary Judgment: "My client has not received any payment on this property
for a great period of time. She is fundamentally deaf, lives in a mobile home, has an
unreliable automobile, and absolutely needs the money from this property." Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2, Christensen v. Brown, No. 85-2-00091-2 (Wash. Super. Ct., Jan. 6,
1986).
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But his neighbors also said they had always maintained good relations with the Vosses?17 When I approached him with a respectful
and sympathetic ear, he spoke unguardedly and at length, answering all my questions in detail. I may have found him more willing
to talk with me than I found Mr. Brown218 because he had "won in
the end," as a practical matter, but he appeared to be still distressed about the litigation and his legal defeat.
Like Mr. Voss, Mr. Brown valued his privacy; in testifying
about purchasing his property, he said:, "we had water, we had a
view, we had privacy, 'or so we thought, at the time."219 Mr. Brown
appears in the record' of the case, and described himself to me, as
"an extremely adamant person about his rights."22o He believed
throughout the dispute that he had a right to use the easement to
benefit Parcel C without consultation with, or permission from, the
Vosses, and he expressed satisfaction'that this right was vindicated
by his legal victory, although "Voss won in a way."221 When I
asked Mr. Brown why he thought their dispute had gone to, and all
the way through, the court system, he said, "It took an extremely
unreasonable person to the point of some mental problems ... and
a fellow who won't stand by and be wronged."222 Fifteen years after the lawsuit began, he continued to express frustration and anger
with Mr. Voss, whom he called "one of the scum-baggiest persons
I've ever met."223 When he learned near the end of our conversation that Mr. Voss now owns Parcel B, he commented-after long
moments of silence-that Mr. Voss did not deserve to have the
property and that "it's unfortunate we didn't bury him right
there. "224

217
218
219
220

I spoke with a number of neighbors of the Vosses who preferred not to be identified.

See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Trial 1i"anscript, supra note 48, at pt. n, 114 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94. Mr. Brown told me that he was not then

and is still not "intimidated by property threats." [d.
Mr. Brown nevertheless stated with no discernable irony, in his affidavit filed in connection with the Vosses' motion for a temporary restraining order: "Mr. and Mrs. Voss
seem to be very protective of their own property." Plaintiffs' Affidavit, supra note 102, at

6.
221

Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94. See infra notes 246-49 and accompanying

text.

222

Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94.
[d. He said that of all the sorts of people he had met in his life, "there is no one I
have more total disregard for" than Mr. Voss; he referred to Mrs. Voss as "his bozo wife."
[d.
224 [d.
223
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Mr. Voss's view of his story was not reflected in or incorporated into the story presented by the Vosses' lawyer.22s In the metaphor of lawyering as translation, Mr. Voss believes their lawyer's
translation did not convey his story, that it was a mistranslation. 226
The lawyer's legal argument was based simply on the application of
the common law rule that an easement may not be used to benefit
nondominant property,227 the rule that preserves the established
private allocation of property rights. He did not attempt to use the
facts of the case to argue either for or from any proffered reasons
for the rule. Nor did he argue from the facts that, if a weighing of
the equities was legally relevant to the outcome, then the balance
was in favor of granting an injunction. 228 The only factual narrative
necessary for the Vosses' lawyer to present, therefore, was that the
easement was created to benefit Parcel B and that it was being
used by the Browns to benefit Parcel C as well as Parcel B. Curiously, however, a majority of the testimony he elicited concerned
trespasses that had been committed by the Browns and their contractors straying onto Parcel A outside the area of the easement. 229
The facts of these trespasses were irrelevant to his simple reliance
on the common law rule. The issues to which these facts would
have been relevant had been resolved before the trial, when the
parties agreed on the location of the easement and the Vosses
abandoned their claim for damages for trespass. 230
Mr. Voss, and even the Vosses' lawyer on his behalf, expressed
discomfort with the translation of Mr. Voss's story they presented
in the litigation, the translation that made such a poor fit with Mr.
Voss's original story. As the trial began, the Vosses' lawyer told
the court that the common law rule "may seem arbitrary, but we
submit these property laws are very strict, and when I give my final
on this, it will show it is Hornbook Law, very plain and simpl[e]
. . . . It may seem extreme, but I suggest that is what the law
i[s]. "231
See infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text on Mr. Voss's reaction; see supra note 8
and accompanying text, on the role of a lawyer as a translator.
227 See infra notes 231, 237-42 and accompanying text.
228 See infra notes 237-42, 281-85 and accompanying text.
229 Roughly calculating by pages in the transcript, more than forty percent of all the
testimony of any kind elicited by the Vosses' lawyer during his case-in-chief involved these
trespasses.
230 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Eliciting testimony about the trespasses
may have been a kind of attempt to tell Mr. Voss's story, to convey his· sense of injury at
Mr. Brown's hand. If so, however, it was an ineffective one because the fact of the trespasses was never incorporated into or related to the Vosses' lawyer's story of the case.
231 Thai lranscript, supra note 48, pt. I, at 12-13.
225

226
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Mr. Voss understood the common law rule, and hoped that he
would prevail under it in his dispute with Mr. Brown,232 but he did
not wish to be, or appear to be, unreasonable, in his objections to
his neighbors' use of the easement. On direct examination, when
chronicling trespasses on Parcel A outside the ea~ement, he referred to a day a few months after the Browns filed suit when the
Browns had a big party "and [Mr. Brown] had people parked
everywhere, which is all right, but everyone of them went on that
access road and had to cross that trespass."233 A few days later,
"and I really shouldn't object to it, but on the other hand ... equipment was parked in there for ... perhaps four days [to drill a well],
and this necessitated vehicles going across the trespass . . . ."234
When the Vosses' lawyer first attempted to elicit a statement from
Mr. Voss that he had never given permission to Mr. Brown to use
the easement to access Parcel C, Mr. Voss instead testified he gave
permission on some occasion for Mr. Brown to exceed the sixteenfoot width of the easement "[i]f necessary to get some piece of
equipment in there, something exceeding 16 feet."235
All three courts were persuaded that the Browns' easement
did not include the right to access Parcel C, but this was of no avail
to the Vosses as the trial court and the court of last resort nevertheless refused to enjoin them from using it for that purpose. In the
two appeals, the Vosses' lawyer236 argued persuasively that the
common law rule applied, that an injunction is the "usual and

Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
1Iial1i"anscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 21 (emphasis added).
234 ld. pt. II, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
235 ld. pt. II, at 27-28.
236 For the reader's convenience I refer to the Vosses' lawyer rather than to the Vosses'
lawyers even though they were represented by more than one person. In the Court of
Appeals, the Brief of Appellants is signed by the original lawyer's son, who had recently
gone into practice with his father. Then, both father and son signed the Reply Brief filed in
that court as well as the Answer to Petition for Review filed in the Supreme Court. Brief
of Appellants at 33, Brown v. Voss, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (No. 06490-1);
Appellants' Reply Brief at 24, Brown v. Voss, 689 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Q. App. 1984) (No.
06490-1), rev'd, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986); Answer to Petition for Review at 8, Brown v.
Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986) (No. 51283-3).
The father alone made the oral argument in the Court of Appeals, and the father and
his daughter, who had recently gone into practice with her father, together made the oral
argument in the Supreme Court. Letter from Paul Grice, Senior Case Manager, Court of
Appeals of Washington, to the author (Nov. 15,1993) (on file with the author); Bailiff's
Record of Counsel at Oral Argument, Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). The son
had been admitted to the bar in 1982, the year the briefing of the appeal began in the
Court of Appeals, and the daughter was admitted to the bar in 1985, the year the case was
briefed and argued in the Supreme Court.
232

233
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traditional" relief,237 and that a showing238 of actual damages is not
required. 239 With respect to the criteria for deciding whether to
grant an injunction, he stated rather cryptically that the issue of
delay, if any, in bringing suit was not relevant in the case; that the
issue of misconduct by the Vosses, if any, was not relevant in the
case; and that, with respect to relative hardships, the Browns, "if
properly enjoined, would suffer no appreciable harm other than
the construction of another road or seeking (and paying for) access
through private eminent domain. "240 The Vosses, on the other
hand, might see the Browns' misuse "ripen[ ] into an easement by
prescription" and "will have lost a valuable property right without
receiving a cent in compensation. "241 He did not explain that the
Browns could build "another road" to their building site because a
public highway passes through both Parcels Band C. Nor did he
explain why the Vosses neglected to pursue their original claim for
damages if they considered a harmful result of affirming the trial
court decision to be their loss of property rights without adequate
compensation. 242

237 Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 21; Answer to Petition for Review, supra note
236, at 7.
238 Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 23; Answer to Petition for Review, supra note
236, at 7.
239 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 23; Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note
236, at 4-12, 23; Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 236, at 5-7.
240 Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 30-31; accord Appellants' Reply Brief, supra
note 236, at 16-17, 23; Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 236, at.7.
In addition, the Vosses' lawyer distinguished this case from a case in which injunctive
relief was denieq, on the grounds that in this case the Browns were not acting innocently or
unintentionally. He asserted that the Browns knew their actions were unlaWful and that
they made no attempt to comply with the terms of the easement. Appellants' Reply Brief,
supra note 236, at 14; Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 236, at 7.
The Vosses' lawyer also made an argument in the intermediate appellate court that the
Vosses might be forced by the denial of the injunction to forcibly prevent the unlawful use
of the easement, an act that a court would be unlikely to enjoin. Brief of Appellants, supra
note 236, at 31·32. But surely a court would give injunctive relief under those circumstances if it would not grant an .injunction in favor of the Vosses against the Browns.
With respect to the possibility of the Vosses condemning a private way of necessity
across the Browns' property, see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
241 Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 30-31; accord Appellants' Reply Brief, supra
note 236, at 16-17,23; Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 236, at 7.
. 242 Similarly, the argument that the Browns ought to be relegated to a different cause of
action, in which they would have to pay to use the easement to benefit Parcel C, is undermined to some extent by the Vosses' failure to pursue their damage claim in this litigation.
See infra note 306, however, discussing why the Vosses·nevertheless would prefer to have
the Browns proceed in that manner.
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III. LAWYERING THE CASE OF BROWN V. VOSS
The Browns' lawyer's simple narrative of events was not effectively refuted by the Vosses' lawyer.243 In fact, it was reinforced by
the Vosses' lawyer's failure to contradict it. The Browns' lawyer's
narrative strategy was successful in that the trial court, and ultimately the court of last resort, were persuaded that an injunction
should not issue. It also succeeded in satisfying Mr. Brown that his
story was well translated into, and therefore vindicated, by the
legal procesS. 244 Another possible benefit of the litigation itself, to
the community, Mr. Voss, and Mr. Brown, a benefit independent of
the outcome, was that the parties engaged in no further physical
violence after the inception of the lawsuit.245 But, as Mr. Brown
himself said, Mr. Voss "won in a way."246 Mr. Voss now owns Parcel B, and the easement is extinguished. 247 Mr. Brown's construction plans were almost certainly delayed248 and therefore perhaps
ultimately defeated by the lengthy litigation and its attendant costs,
as well as by his financial difficulties. 249
One can commend the Browns' lawyer's effort both to respond sympathetically to his clients' story250 and to zealously represent, or effectively translate, his clients' point of view.
Furthermore, one can empathize with his desire to defeat the
troublesome counterclaim that arose in the lawsuit he initiated for
the Browns. 251 But might his clients have been even better served
if he could have persuaded Mr. Brown to amend his story, to parSee supra notes 225-31 and infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text, discussing Mr. Brown's satisfaction
with the way his story was presented, and infra note 259, with respect to how litigants may
be dissatisfied because they feel they did not have a chance to tell their stories.
245 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
246 Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94.
247 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
248 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
243

244

249 The trial court decision was issued more than three years after the lawsuit and the
counterclaim were filed. The complaint was filed March 23,1979. The counterclaim was
filed on April 17, 1979. Fjnally, the trial court issued its decision on July 15, 1982. The
court of appeals reversal came more than two years later, on October 15, 1984, and the
supreme court decision almost a year and a half after that, on March 6, 1986.
250 On the role of empathy, and approval, in lawyer-client relations, see Stephen
Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1992).
251 Mr. Brown told me his lawyer "took a personal interest" in the case, even though his
lawyer was "never fully compensated." Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94. That his
lawyer was concerned about payment by the Browns is evidenced by the fact that in September 1984, in the pending case between the Browns and the Vosses, he filed a lien
against Parcel C ($3,539.52 for legal services rendered from June 1982 through Sept. 1984).
The Browns' lawyer continued to represent them after they had stopped paying installment
payments and taxes on their property and had moved to Alaska. See supra notes 83-93
and accompanying text.
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ticipate in a reconstructive translation of his own experience that
might have facilitated settlement, perhaps even before the suit was
filed?252 Once the counterclaim arose, could his lawyer have persuaded him that vanquishing the traditional rule was not only unlikely, but was also unnecessary in principle, as onerous as it then
seemed to him in operation, because the rule is based on his own
concern for the rights of property owners to do as they please with
their property? In other words, could his lawyer have effected a
positive example of the assertion that "the power to define the client's problem is one tool professionals may use to induce client
cooperation with their prescription of appropriate behavior"?253
Or, in the ideal of successful translation described by Professor
Clark Cunningham, could his lawyer have used language to help
the parties "recognize[] the conceptual difference[s] that separated
them" in order to "revitalize[] perception," "constitute[] new
knowledge," and "bridg[e] the gap" between them?254
252 A "self-help law book," Neighbor Law, advises the reader to approach his or her
neighbor with the reader's complaints and "to assume that the neighbor is unaware he is
making your life miserable." CoRA JORDAN, NEIGHBOR LAW: FENCES, TREES, BOUNDARIES AND NOISE 1112 (1991). "[S]imply telling your neighbor will resolve a significant
number of problems," the book predicts, but "[d]on't be surprised if the neighbor answers
with a complaint of his own." Id. Relations between Mr. Brown and Mr. Voss seem to be
an extreme illustration of this warning, with Mr. Brown complaining of Mr. Voss's relations' trespass (according to Mr. Voss), Mr. Voss complaining about the Browns' use of the
easement, the men's fight and its aftermath, the Browns suing over their general right to
use the easement, and, finally, the Vosses rolling out the cannon of their counterclaim. See
supra part II.
253 Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What
Is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBS. 599, 599-600
(1979).

Surely it is professionally responsible, if not professionally imperative, for a lawyer to
offer an alternate point of view to his client when the lawyer understands his client's point
of view and believes that the alternative would be more advantageous for his client. Indeed, the caring lawyer may even properly choose "paternalistic intervention when she
believes that the very knowledge she has gained from her close engagement with her client
demonstrates the need for action." Stephen EHmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for
Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665, 2704 (1993).
Ellmann goes on to argue that the caring lawyer may, when
[f]aced with the possibility of treating a third party with indifference ... , persuade her client to abandon his current, uncaring preferences. Declining to
rank client autonomy as automatically superior to other moral concerns, the
caring lawyer could properly feel that she should try to reshape her client's
decisionmaking rather than permit him to make a putatively independent, but
uncaring, choice.
Id. at 2708-09.
For citations to scholarly literature on client autonomy and a discussion of the difficulty in practice of distinguishing "a judgment that a client choice is autonomous from a
judgment that a choice is in the client's best interests," see Simon, supra note 8, at 213 n.l.
254 Cunningham, A Tale of Tho Clients, supra note 8, at 2490-91.
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More prosaically, could his lawyer have persuaded him that it
would be preferable to "win" as a practical matter-developing his
property sooner and with less interference-by negotiating rather
than litigating? It is not possible to tell from the. record whether
any settlement efforts were made and whether, if attempted, they
could have been successful. The record in the case contains no reference to any such efforts, and none were reported by either party
in his interview. Mr. Brown indicated to the contrary that he was
determined not to be "pushed around," not to acknowledge any
assertion by Mr. Voss that the Browns might not be legally entitled
to use the easement to benefit Parcel C. 255
The Vosses, despite the aggravation and costs associated with
the litigation, were almost certainly not as adversely affected as the
Browns by the absence of a settlement and the years of litigation.
As Mr. Voss concluded,256 the Vosses won in the end even though
their lawyer's narrative was ultimately unsuccessfup57 Nevertheless, Mr. Voss expressed frustration that he had not been able to
tell his story,258 a reaction consonant with research about litigants'
dissatisfaction that has shown it to be "notably independent of outcome."259 In sum, Mr. Brown won in court, at least in some sense
lost in reality, and might have been better represented by a less
faithful translation of his story; while Mr. Voss lost in court, won in
255
256

Interview with Mr. Brown, supra note 94.
Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83.
257 Mr. Voss told me that after the Supreme Court issued its decision, his lawyer told
him he had won the case. He was surprised therefore, he said, to receive a notice that he
was required to pay the Browns' costs, but he paid the bill without comment. Interview
with Mr. Voss, supra note 83. His lawyer may have reported accurately, even though the
court left undisturbed the denial of an injunction, that the court agreed with the courts
below that the Browns did not have a legal right to use the easement to benefit Parcel B.
258 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
As Clark Cunningham reflected on his own representation of a case, a client may have
concerns equally important yet unrelated to the outcome:
[I]t can be a mistake to assume that a client is interested only in "winning" the
case rather than in understanding both "what happened" and what is happening. In that case the student lawyers and I had made the common assumption
that our client was interested only in an outcome measured by dollars and that
he did not particularly care what route was used to reach that outcome. In fact,
he cared very much what route was used, what story was told on his behalf.
Cunningham, A Tale o/Two Clients, supra note 8, at 2492. Similarly, Naomi Cahn observes
in her article on feminist litigation that sometimes it is "more important for the client to
tell her story and for the trier of fact to hear it and incorporate the story into its decision
than it is to win a major financial victory." Cahn, supra note 8, at 17.
259 Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 8, at 1301.
A study of laypersons' experiences in the legal system concluded that "[w]in or lose,
people seem to be happier" if they have an opportunity to tell their stories. JOHN M.
CoNLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF
LEGAL DISCOURSE 177 (1990).
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reality, and might have been better represented if his lawyer had
more faithfully translated his story and, in the process, refuted the
suggestive narrative of the Browns' lawyer's story. The Vosses'
lawyer might have effected a more faithful and ultimately more legally successful translation if he had explored the relevance of Mr.
Voss's story, and of the available physical facts, to reasons why the
courts in this case should not have departed from the traditional
common law rule-either by an outright reallocation of the parties'
rights or by applying a liability rule to reallocate the parties' rights
but allow compensation in damages. 2OO
For departures from what Stewart Sterk calls the ordinary "geometric-box allocation" of property rights between two neighbors,
the primary justification is that an allocation across boundary lines
is faithful to the intent of the parties or their predecessors in interest. 261 This primary justification for departures from geometricbox allocations-represented, for example, by the rationale for
easements by implication262-is, of course, irrelevant to the dispute between Mr. Brown and Mr. Voss, who could not be said to
have intended, either as part of a transaction or by a course of conduct, to agree to an expansion of the dominant estate.
A secondary justification for departures from the geometricbox allocation is that in bilateral-monopoly situations, in which
"neither party has good alternatives to dealing with the other,"263
there may be high transaction costs that prevent neighbors from
reaching efficient agreements.264 Sterk argues that this secondary
bilateral-monopoly justification, like the primary intent justification, does not supply a comprehensive rationale for all departures
and that, even when it is most persuasive, the bilateral-monopoly
justification itself rests on underlying social norms. 265 He therefore
offers the alternative or additional explanation that departures
from the geometric-box allocation both reflect and impose "social
norms of neighborliness."266 Neither this bilateral-monopoly justification nor this social norm of neighborliness supports the court's
260 Technically, of course, the court in this case applied the equivalent of a liability rule
by denying only injunctive relief. In effect, however, the court accomplished an outright
reallocation because the servient estate owners, the Vosses, had not pursued their damage
claim and had not appealed the trial court's award of one dollar in (unsought) damages.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
261 Sterk, supra note 66, at 56-67.
262 Id. at 63-64; see, e.g., CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.4:
263 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (1992).
264 Id. at 61-62.
265 Sterk, supra note 66, at 83-88.
266 Id. at 90-103.
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departure in Brown v. Voss from the geometric-box allocation of
rights.
Under the Coase Theorem,267 there might be no economic efficiency justification for a judicial reallocation of the Browns' and
the Vosses 7 rights. Whether the traditional common law rule assigns to one neighbor or the other the right to control use of the
easement to benefit Parcel C, they will reach an agreement in the
absence of transaction costs under which the right is allocated to
the one who values. it most. However, there may be transaction
costs, and they may be high. 268 For example, the neighbors may
engage in nonoptimal bargaining strategies that prevent them from
reaching agreement within a time limit,269 or they may engage in
strategic bargaining that prevents them from ever reaching agreement. If so, reallocating rights, or imposing a bargain on the parties, may be efficient even when it is not possible to infer intent on
the parts of the parties or their predecessors.27?
The Browns' lawyer's story capitalized implicitly on this rationale for a cross-boundary allocation. According to his narrative
of the facts, an efficient bargain would award the' right to the
Browns because of its high value to them (access to their property)
and its lack of any value to the Vosses, except as a strategic bargaining tool. Mr. Voss's irrational behavior and the Vosses' attempt through their counterclaim to thwart the Browns' highervalue use shows that strategic bargaining costs would impede private negotiations between the parties.
To counter these implications of the Brown's lawyer's narrative, the Vosses' lawyer could have argued, initially, that there was
no bilateral monopoly in this case. The Browns sought property to
develop in the general area in which Mr: Brown had grown Up.271
The aggregated Parcels Band C, for which the Browns would need
the Vosses' permission to access via the easement, was not the only
property available for development. 272 This case is quite different
from one in which, for example, an established homeowner who
267 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Of course, a
reallocation of property rights may have desirable or undesirable wealth distribution effects. See, e.g., Barbara A. White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man,
n IOWA L. REv. 577, 595-98 (1987).
268 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism," 99 YALE
L.J. 611 (1989).
269 Sterk, supra note 66, at 71.
270 Id. at 68-75; see also POSNER, supra note 263, at 62, 70.
271 'frial Transcript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 114-15 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
272 This appeared evident from touring the far-from-fully-developed area, and the
Browns and their lawyer refer at trial to the possibility of their having purchased other
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accesses his property via an easement over Neighbor A's property
has an opportunity to annex a small, sunny strip of Neighbor B's
property in order to enlarge his vegetable garden.
Even if it were conceded that the situation involved a bilateral
monopoly, the Vosses' lawyer could have argued for two reasons
that it was not a bilateral monopoly justifying a departure from the
geometric-box allocation. First, and most simply, the facts explored in Part II show that there was no problem of strategic bargaining impeding the parties from realizing a gain from trade, a
problem common to bilateral monopoly situations. Mr. Brown
maintained throughout the dispute and maintains up to today that
the Vosses had no right about which it was necessary to bargain. In
other words, Mr. Brown was averse to bargaining with and consequently never attempted to bargain with Mr. VOSS.273
The second reason the Vosses' lawyer could have offered to
explain why it was not a bilateral monopoly that justified a departure from the geometric-box allocation is that it was not a type of
bilateral-monopoly situation in which it is efficient to and in which
the law does depart from a geometric-box allocation. 1\vo related
problems that Sterk identifies with creating law that assigns rights
to those who value them most highly are (1) the administrative difficulty and cost of ascertaining the relative value parties attach to a
right and (2) the increased likelihood of litigation rather than private settlement when a rule is uncertain in application. 274 In the
cases of easements by implication from prior use, easements by necessity, easements by estoppel, and prescriptive easements, the efficiency advantages are "relatively clear without extensive,
individualized investigation by courts" and "the alternative crossboundary entitlements can themselves be defined with some
rigidity. "275
In the case of easements by necessity, "a court need only ascertain that a landowner is landlocked and that he became landlocked on severance,"276 and the court need only provide for a
right of way that will last as long as the necessity.277 In the case of
easements implied from prior use, the court must undertake the
property. See id. pt. II, at 114-15, 136 (direct examination of Mr. Brown); id. pt. II, at 143
(direct examination of Mrs. Brown).
273 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
274 Sterk, supra note 66, at 74-75.
275 Id. at 75; see also id. at 75-79 (explaining why this is so with respect to each of the
types of easements in turn).
276 Id. at 76; see, e.g., CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.5.
277 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 14, at 822.
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somewhat more difficult task of determining the existence and nature of prior use before the severance. This determination regarding prior use, in tum, defines the scope of the easement by
implication. 278 With respect to easements by estoppel, the servient
landowner's expenditures in reliance on informal permission, together with the dominant landowner's grant of informal permission
and subsequent inaction, provide strong evidence of the relative
value of the right to the neighbors and the nature of the easement. 279 Similarly, easements by prescription also involve reliable
indicia of relative value and of the nature of the easement: longterm use by the dominant estate owner and long-term inaction by
the servient estate owner.280
The Vosses' lawyer could have argued that weighing the relative hardships of the parties in this case, with and without an injunction-weighing the relative value of the right at issue-was
not the simple matter that the Browns' lawyer implied with his
story of a single-family house straddling two similar-sized lots. The
situation, in fact, could be distinguished from a situation in which
the Browns constructed a single-family house only on Parcel B.281
Parcel C was more than twice as large as Parcel B. 282 The Browns
had already constructed what was, in effect, a small house on Parcel B complete with carpeting, appliances, and a projected carport.
The big house they were planning was to be considerably larger
than a house that could have been constructed on Parcel B
alone.283 Therefore, the land preparation and the construction
work already undertaken and planned for the future was probably
more substantial than the work that would have been undertaken
on only one parcel. The Browns' lawyer had argued the relevance
of the more southerly servient landowners' lack of complaints,284
but a walk through the properties of these neighbors immediately
reveals that they have complete visual and sound privacy from Parcels Band C. This insulation is created by heavy vegetation and
the manner in which the houses that were built to the south have
been situated. In other words, their physical relation to the
Browns' property is entirely different from the Vosses'.
278
279
280

281
282
283

284

CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, § 8.4; Sterk, supra note 66, at 76-77.
Sterk, supra note 66, at 77.
Id. at 78-79.
See infra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
See Fig. 2, supra page 1481; see also supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra note 142 and aCcompanying text.
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With respect to the Browns' potential hardship, the easement
was not their only access to Parcel C: they could have built a driveway from the public highway passing through the foot of Parcel
0 85 up the hill to their building sites, a project that would have
been expensive but that would have been facilitated by the width
of their "double lot." The Vosses' lawyer could have argued that
the existence of all of these facts made the task of weighing relative
hardships both complex and costly. Instead of burdening the court
with this task, why not let the parties weigh the relative hardships
by bargaining?
Additionally, the Vosses' lawyer could have argued that the
trial court's alternative cross-boundary entitlement was far from
well-defined. The trial court essentially rewrote the original easement with its grant of permission to the' Browns to use the easement to benefit Parcel C as well as Parcel B "as long as [the
Browns's] properties (B and C) are developed and used solely for
the purpose of a single family residence. "286 Because of the unique
nature of the trial court's cross-boundary entitlement, there is no
body of law that could help define it. At the time of the decision,
there were already two habitable structures on Parcel B.287 What
did the trial court mean by its limitation of the Browns' use of their
property to a house straddling the line between Parcels Band C?
Did the new house actually have to sit squarely on the line? If outbuildings were permissible, could the Browns have erected structures on Parcel C for dry-docking a boat or storing vehicles and
equipment used in a business? Could they have built additional
habitable structures for guests or rent-paying tenants?
In addition to the easements by implication, necessity, estoppel, and prescription, another kind of bilateral-monopoly case in
which the law departs from the geometric-box allocation is the case
in which a court denies injunctive relief and awards only damages
to a landowner whose property has been encroached upon by a
neighbor's "innocent" construction of an improvement over their
mutual boundary line. 288 In such a situation, the court relies on the
See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 23, at 5.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
288 Sterk, supra note 66, at 80.
In cases in which a boundary is altered by application of the doctrine of adverse possession, there are, as discussed above in connection with the acquisition of prescriptive
rights, reliable indicia of the relative value of the adversely possessed strip of land: longterm use by the adverse possessor and long-term inaction by the adverse possessor's neighbor. See iii. at 79.
285

286
287
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concepts of "relative hardship" or "balancing the equities."289
Once again, the court's underlying concern-that strategic bargaining difficulties will impede negotiation between the parties290-is
not relevant to Brown v. Voss, in which there was no attempt at
negotiation. 291
Furthermore, the court generally will grant injunctive relief,
and require removal of the improvement, when the encroaching
improver knew he was encroaching, or should have investigated
more carefully.292 The underlying reason for granting injunctive
relief in such cases is relevant to the case of Brown v. VOSS.293 Permitting the encroacher to evade responsibility for understanding
information in the public records regarding the boundaries of his
and his neighbor's property creates the unnecessary judicial burdens of first determining the encroacher's knowledge294 and, second, determining the relative hardships to the parties of granting or
denying injunctive relief. 295 The Vosses' lawyer thus could argue
that Mr. Brown should have known from the documents in his
chain of title that his easement was not created to benefit Parcel C,
and could not therefore be used in such a way without the Vosses'
permission. The courts should not expend their resources to protect him from the consequences of his carelessness.
Like the bilateral-monopoly justification, a social norm of
neighborliness does not support a departure from the traditional
common law rule in Brown v. Voss. The social norm that Sterk
sees reflected in and enforced by departures from geometric-box
allocations is a duty of neighbors to cooperate with one another in
a relationship of "continuing mutual dependence. "296 A failure to
meet this duty generally results in an actual cross-boundary alloca[d. at 80.
[d. at 79-83.
See supra part II.A-B.
Sterk, supra note 66, at 80-81.
Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 519 (Wash. 1986) (Dore, J., dissenting).· The dissent
made this point, noting that the Browns were responsible for creating their own hardship.
They knew or should have known from the public records that the easement
was not appurtenant to [P]arcel C.... In encroachment cases this factor is
significant. ... "The benefit of the doctrine of balancing the equities, or relative
hardship, is reserved for the innocent defendant who proceeds without knowledge or warning that his structure encroaches upon another's property or property rights."
[d. (citations omitted). The court of appeals made a similar assessment in the intermediate
appeal of the case. Brown v. Voss, 689 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 715
P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
294 Sterk, supra note 66, at 82.
295 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
296 Sterk, supra note 66, at 95-96.
289

290
291
292
293
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tion of entitlements only when there had been a prior course of
dealing between the neighbors, such as a grant of land, or when a
neighbor's assertion of the entitlement has continued without objection over a period of time, as in the case of an easement by prescription. 297 Even when there has been an "extensive course of
dealing" between the neighbors, courts generally make crossboundary allocations only if "the neighbor [awarded the entitlement] could otherwise face a serious predicament. "298
Here again, the Browns' lawyer's story capitalized implicitly
on this basis for cross-boundary allocations, and its success in this
regard is reflected in the assumption made by many of my students
that the Vosses had been and were spitefully interfering with the
Browns' plans. 299 According to the BroWns' lawyer's narrative of
the facts, Mr. Voss's conduct must have been and continued to be
unneighborly because there was no reason for Mr. Voss to oppose
the Browns' use of the easement to benefit Parcel C. The Vosses
stood by while the Browns invested in their property, and the
Browns' plans would be completely stymied without access to Parcel C via the easement. To counter these implications of the
Browns' lawyer's story, the Vosses' lawyer would have found Mr.
Voss's story and the physical facts the most relevant and useful of
all.
There had been no prior course of dealing between Mr. Brown
and Mr. Voss. The Browns bought their parcels from others.3°O
There had been no acquiescence by the Vosses in the Browns' use
of the easement. Because the Vosses had never learned the specific nature of the Browns' planned use,30l the Vosses' conduct
could not have constituted acquiescence to that use; and the
Browns knew, in Mr. Brown's own words, that Mr. Voss generally
"objected to everything."302 The lawsuit began, in fact, with the
Browns' claim against the Vosses that the Vosses were interfering
with their use of the easement. 303 Mr. Voss's complaints against
Mr. Brown, before and after the lawsuit was filed, however zealously he may have felt and pursued them, were founded on what
Mr. Voss experienced as a lack of neighborliness on Mr. Brown's
297
298
299

300
301

302
303

Id. at 96-100.
Id. at 100-01.
See supra text accompanying note 81.
See supra note 184.
See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
1iial Transcript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 137 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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part. 304 And the predicament the Browns would have faced without the use of the easement to benefit Parcel C was not as serious
as it would have been if Parcel C had really been landlocked, as at
least the two appellate courts believed it to be. 305
If Mr. Brown had been willing to negotiate with Mr. Voss, the
coin he would have had to offer niight not have been monetary; it
might have instead been a demonstration of respect for the Vosses'
legal right and a willingness to make the Vosses privy to the
Browns' development plans, both initially and as the plans were
refined over time. 306 In their relations, a social norm of neighborliness might have indicated a positive kind of strategic behavior
aptly described in a recent murder mystery novel set in suburban
New Jersey. The detective-narrator refers to his grass-obsessed
neighbor's lawnmower:
[a] fearsome ... two-seater mower, which reduced his tiny lawn
to Astro Thrf and decimated any tranquillity that might have
arrived with Saturday mornings. Worse, I was forced to repeatedly admire his machinery, even though I found it wasteful, polluting, and intrusive. But in suburbia, where today's enemy can
provide tomorrow's school emergency-contact number, you offend your next-door neighbor only after life-and-death
provocation. 307

IV.

TEACHING THE CASE OF BROWN V.

Voss

For teaching the case of Brown v. Voss, does it matter that the
narrative of the opinion is incomplete and inaccurate, as explicated
in Part II of this article? In an important sense the answer is "no,"
given that a law professor must train students to analyze and apply
See supra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text, discussing the courts' misperception
that Parcel C was landlocked.
306 From this point of view, a suit to privately condemn the right of way would have
been more palatable to Mr. Voss than this litigation because it would have been predicated
on a recognition of the Vosses' property right.
In a study of how rural landowners in Shasta County, California, resolve disputes over
trespasses by livestock, Robert C. Ellickson found that changes in liability rules did not
affect neighbors' resource allocations, not because transaction costs were low but because
they were high. Neighbors relied on less costly, informal norms, under which "[t]o hire an
attorney is to escalate a conflict. A good neighbor does not do such a thing because the
'natural working order' calls for two neighbors to work out their problems between themselves." Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors
in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623, 683 (1986). In the case of Brown v. Voss, of
course, Mr. Brown's position was that he should not have had to negotiate or deal with his
neighbor Mr. Voss, see supra note 151 and accompanying text, and the court, by denying
the Vosses injunctive relief, in effect endorsed his position.
307 JON KATZ, THE FAMILY STALKER 6 (1994).
304
305
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case law. 3OB Particularly in the first year of law school, that may
involve helping students substitute their initial emotional responses
to the facts of a case with more complex and reasoned responses.
Law professor Paul T. Wangerin discusses this aspect of legal
training in an article on the cognitive and moral development of
law students. He applies developmental psychologist William
Perry's theory about students' progressive stages of cognitive development, the theory that students move from a dualistic perception that "all information can be classified as either right or wrong
and ... uncertainty is an error of some sort"309 toward, and perhaps then beyond, a more multiplistic perspective in which " 'all
knowledge and values ... [are] contextual and relativistic.' "310
Wangerin argues that the early, dualistic kind of thinking, "which
must be rooted out," may appear as "expressions by students of
values, feelings, and beliefs. "311 To supply and thus emphasize narrative contexts of Brown v. Voss may only encourage such dualistic
expressions. Furthermore, it is precisely the doctrinally anomalous
quality of the Brown v. Voss opinion that makes it particularly useful intellectually for exploring the content of and theories underlying easement law, as explained in Part I of this Article. It is
presumably this quality of the opinion that makes it attractive to
the property text authors who have included or described it in their
casebooks.312
There are, nevertheless, a number of drawbacks to teaching
the opinion in its incomplete and inaccurate isolation. First, it may
make the cognitive task of understanding the case more difficult.
Secondly, it divests the case of its value as a lesson in lawyering.
And thirdly, it limits students' ability to evaluate the court's
decision.
308 See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 13, at 585 (discussing the view of the case method as a
"systematic way of teaching one important practice skill").
309 Paul T. Wangerin, Objective, Multiplistic, and Relative Truth in Developmental Psychology and Legal Education, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1237,1246 (1988). The theory of cognitive
development he applies was developed by William Perry, using interviews with undergraduates at Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges. See WILLIAM G. PERRY, JR., FORMS OF INTEL·
LEcruAL AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE YEARS: A SCHEME (1970).
William G. Perry, Jr., Cognitive and Ethical Growth: The Making of Meaning, in THE MODERN AMERICAN CoLLEGE: RESPONDING TO THE NEW REALITIES OF DIVERSE STUDENTS
AND A CHANGING SOCIETY 76 (Arthur W. Chickering et al. eds., 1981). Professor
Wangerin's exhaustively researched article uses the work of a number of researchers on
cognitive and moral development to explore the "special responsibilities of law school
professors" in legal education. Wangerin, supra, at 1240.
310 Wangerin, supra note 309, at 1249.
311 ld. at 1282 n.I71; see also Payton, supra note 13, at 236.
312 See supra note 18 for a list of these casebooks.
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With respect to the cognitive task of understanding the case,
research on the cognition of learning processes has suggested that
students "come to the learning process with a base of knowledge
and values as well as some cognitive structures already in place,"
and that students learn not as passive "recipient[s] of information"
but as active "constructor[s] of meaning," either incorporating
learning within prior knowledge or modifying prior knowledge. 313
Most students come to law school with some appreciation for and
perhaps even some experience of the kinds of personal conflicts
that may arise between neighbors. Most also arrive with little or
no appreciation for the arguments that may be made for and
against cross-boundary allocations of property entitlements. Thus,
divorcing the unfamiliar doctrinal and theoretical territory from
the more familiar terrain of neighborly feuding may make it more
rather than less difficult for students to construct new legal meanings for themselves.
This possibility may account in some part for my observation
that many students appear to have an easier time than they have
with Brown v. Voss when, earlier in the semester, they analyze the
doctrine and theories of the adverse possession case, Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz. 314 The Van Valkenburgh opinion, which involves,
inter alia, complex and internally inconsistent notions about the
state-of-mind requirements for adverse possession,315 is preceded
in the text by an extensive "prologue" in which the text's authors
summarize the background of the case based on information contained in the record and the briefs submitted by the parties. 316 It is
followed by an "epilogue" in which the authors summarize the aftermath. 317 Students learn about the history of the couple claiming
title by adverse possession (the Lutzes), the incident in 1946 that
ignited the hostility between them and the owners of the disputed
property (the Van Valkenburghs), and something of the lawyering
of the case. 318 Although the Lutzes lost the case, students learn
both that the Van Valkenburghs failed to execute the judgment
313 Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual
Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1269, 1294 (1991) (drawing on a variety of recent scholarly
work on education and cognition); see also, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on
Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty Considers the Implications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 275 (1989).
314 106 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1952), reprinted in DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 14, at 125-

35.
DUKEMINIER & KNIER, supra note 14, at 128-30.
Id. at 125-28.
317 Id. at 134-35.
318 Id. at 125-35.

315

316
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against the couple's house-because of a lawyer's procedural error-and that subsequent, protracted litigation by other members
of the couple's family kept the family in actual possession of the
disputed property until 1968, more than twenty years after the
commencement of hostilities. 319 Even though most of this information is not as relevant to the issues in that case as the information
in Part II is relevant to the issue in Brown v. Voss, it gives students
a concrete and familiar context within which they may analyze the
lawyers' strategies and the legal issues.
With respect to its value as a lesson in lawyering, the Brown v.
Voss opinion's incomplete and inaccurate narrative hinders the
kind of learning process through which students can explore the
activity of translating clients' stories. Theories about the development of professional knowledge and skills have stressed the value
for students of participating in a community in which practitioners
use their knowledge, of undertaking practical exercises under the
guidance and supervision of expert practitioners, and of developing
a personal stake in their knowledge. 320 There is a large and growing body of literature that includes explorations of different ways
these general notions can be applied to legal education. In the law
school setting, live-client clinical offerings most closely approximate these educational ideals of experiential learning, requiring
students to integrate doctrine and theory with practice in order to
represent their clients and to reflect with their instructors on that
representation. 321 Simulated skills exercises to a lesser extent involve similar requirements and achieve similar benefits.322 But
Id. at 134-35.
See, e.g., MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRmCAL
PHILOSOPHY (1958); DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTmONER:
TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS (1987);
DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN AcTION (1983).
321 See, e.g., David R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory
and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67 (1979); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical
Lawyer-School?,81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933); Spiegel, supra note 13; Alan A. Stone,
Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REv. 392,418,428-40 (1971) (on the benefits
of student projects and clinical education); Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional
Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. GIN. L. REv. 93 (1968) (discussing the need for experiential learning in law school through "problem courses," involvement of practitioners, clinical programs with "interpreted experience").
322 See, e.g., Stephen Nathanson, The Role of Problem Solving in Legal Education, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1989); Edward D. Ohlbaum, Basic Instinct: Case Theory and Courtroom Performance, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1 (1993); Abraham P. Ordover, Teaching Sensitivity
to Facts, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 813 (1991); Jane E. Schukoske, Teaching Law Reform in
the 199Os, 3 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 177 (1992) ("law reform simulation" seminar in
which students collaborate with advocates in the community and develop law reform pro319
320
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even traditional classroom discussion can simulate and stimulate in
an introductory way this kind of learning when a dramatically visualized case, in Llewellyn's exhortation, "foams as golden as Toronto ale."323
The opinion alone in Brown v. Voss is too flat to fully facilitate
this kind of learning. With only the opinion to go on, it is difficult
for students to enter imaginatively into the lawyering process; they
cannot engage in the descriptive analysis illustrated in Part II of the
lawyers' narrative strategies. The strategies are concealed behind
the drawn, opaque curtain of the opinion. Nor can students engage
in the critical analysis illustrated in Part III of the lawyers' narrative strategies, which would allow them to ponder the doctrinal,
theoretical, and, ultimately, professional responsibility questions
raised in that part about the lawyers' representation of their clients,
including the perhaps paradoxical questions of whether one lawyer's translation of his client's story was too faithful and the other's
not faithful enough.
Finally, it is the questionable success of one lawyer as translator and the failure of the other that makes it difficult, especially for
first-year law students, to evaluate critically the Supreme Court of
Washington's cross-boundary allocation of rights. 324 Students lack
a story complete enough to engage fully in the analysis illustrated
in Part III of whether the court's departure from the geometric-box
allocation of property rights is supported by any of the justifications that courts and scholars have advanced for such departures.
posals); Andrew E. Taslitz, Exorcising Langdell's Ghost: Structuring a Criminal Procedure
Casebook/or How Lawyers Really Think, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 143 (1991); Joseph P. Tomain,
Lawyering in First-Year Property, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 111 (1983) (simulated exercise);
Wangerin, supra note 309, at 1282 n.l71 (calling for restructuring of upper-level curriculum
to focus on counseling and negotiating exercises); Woodhouse, supra note 13 (course
based on extended simulation and involving outside experts); see also Stone, supra note
321; Watson, supra note 321.
323 LLEWELLYN, supra note 4, at 61.
In response to a similar passage in The Bramble Bush, Jack Himmelstein responds that
"I read these words as a plea for experiential learning. By experiential learning in law I do
not mean clinical courses, although clinics have grown in part because of ... that need. By
experiential learning, I mean, as I read Llewellyn to mean, the integration of idea and
human experience." ELIZABETH DVORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 149 (1981) (commentary by
coauthor Jack Himmelstein on Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush).
324 "Failure to translate for the client ... impoverishes the law. Like all forms of knOWledge, law arises out of experience. Qients are the source of that experience. Their understanding of that experience is likely to retain elements lost in the legal understanding,
elements that might enrich our legal knowledge." Cunningham, Tale 0/ Two Clients, supra
note 8, at 2493. FlfSt-year law students' limited exposure to the law makes it more difficult
for them than it is for more advanced students and lawyers to imagine the possible stories
that may have been lost in translation.
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In addition, the opinion's opaque narrative limits students' ability
to respond emotionally to the character of the dispute between Mr.
Brown and Mr. Voss. This limitation circumscribes their ability to
evaluate the court's decision in the view of those who maintain that
"fine attention and good deliberation require a highly complex,
nuanced perception of, and emotional response to, the concrete
features of ... context, including particular persons and relationships. "325 It is my perhaps immodest hope that the parts of this
Article, and the stories they tell, demonstrate to some degree the
validity of this view by providing the reader with the experience of
evaluating and reevaluating the court's decision as he or she learns
more about the story of the dispute. When students go without this
experience, they are in a position not entirely unlike that of the
jurist who resigned from the bench when a head injury rather than
a lack of information deprived him of emotional response. He explained "that he could no longer enter sympathetically into the motives of anyone concerned, and that since justice involved feeling,
and not merely thinking, he felt that his injury totally disqualified
him."326
Exploring these pedagogical limitations of studying the opinion in isolation has led me to question whether they may be related

325 NUSSBAUM, supra note 11, at 7 (describing novelist Henry James's belief); see supra
notes 15-22 (discussing the limitations of the opinion and their impact on the educational
value of the case); see also Henderson, supra note 11; Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal
Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REv. 193,234 (1991) (psychologist's study of
law students, supporting call for legal education to "reject the sexual discrimination between the putative dualisms of human behavior-i.e., thinking and feeling, objectivity and
subjectivity, reason and emotion"); Frances Olsen, The.Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 453 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). .
In a review of a book on moral theory, law professors Patricia A. Cain and Jean C.
Love comment on the danger of teaching cases out of a fuller factual context. They conclude that the book author's
hypotheticals and our edited cases [in law school texts], pared of their full facts,
are valuable teaching tools. A good teacher can use the starkness of such stories to capture a student's attention. But when such stories are stripped of real
human context, our intuitive reactions to them may be distorted. Therefore,
when we are building moral and legal theory in the classroom, we must be
sensitive to this risk. When stories are used as foundations for theory, perhaps
they should be told in full.
Patricia A. Cain & Jean C. Love, Stories of Rights: Developing Moral Theory and Teaching
Law, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1365, 1387 (1988) (reviewing JUDITH J. THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION & RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY (1986».
326 Oliver Sacks, A Neurologist's Notebook: An Anthropologist on Mars, NEW YORKER,
Dec. 27, 1993/Jan. 3, 1994, at 106, 123. For a searching discussion of how" 'passion' is
necessary for good thinking" and "good thinking is necessary for what [Justice Brennan]
calls 'passion,' " see Martha M. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10
CARDOZO L. REv. 37, 39 (1988) (discussion by a law professor and philosophy professor,
respectively, on methods of evaluating judicial conduct).
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to a kind of emotional stress experienced by some law students. It
is beyond the scope of this meditation on one case in context to
seek an answer in the significant body of academic literature exploring the emotional stresses experienced by law students. 327 But
I cannot conclude without adding an admittedly personal observation. Teaching the case of Brown v. Voss has not only led me to
feel peculiarly unhelpful-as if I were a repository of empty analytical facts-but it has also evoked a feeling of discomfort I experienced as a first-year law student, and thus caused me to wonder if
I have become, unwittingly, a collaborator in an element of legal
education that troubled me as a student.
At the University of Chicago, I found most of my professors
dazzlingly talented teachers, yet sometimes, in some of their classrooms, I felt alienated from their prodigious analytical feats. I
think I perceived an implicit, even if entirely unintended, message
in their exegesis of cases like Brown v. Voss that the more complex,
nuanced narratives the opinions might lack, or only hint at-and
the emotional responses such narratives might engage-were not
important for lawyering and for judging the cases. That message
seemed to deny the value of the knowledge one had brought to law
schooP28 (and thus, perhaps, even the value of the person who possessed that knowledge). And that message seemed to be fundamentally false. 329 Is the perception of such a message by some
students an inevitable part of their educational journey?330 Can it
327 For a discussion of this topic, see, for example, Stephen B.. Shanfield & G. Andrew
H. Benjamin, Psychiatric Distress in Law Students, 35 J. LEGAL EDue. 65 (1985); Stone,
supra note 321; Watson, supra note 321.
328 See supra note 313 and accompanying text. As Jane Schukoske put it in an article on
teaching law reform: "Traditional legal education gives students the impression that their
experiences and previous education are secondary to the legal reasoning skills they are
acquiring in law school. ... Students need to hear their own voices as they learn to think
about and use the law." Schukoske, supra note 322, at 193.
329 See supra part IV.
Andrew S. Watson, a professor of psychiatry as well as law, describes a related reaction by law students to the fact that the appellate opinions they study report
only a small part of the events as they occurred .... They reveal little, if anything at all, about the actual lawyer-client relationship, but only the conclusions
which result from "this process. This inevitably frustrates the avid desire of
many students to find out how lawyers function, and will thus generate more
resentment ....
Watson, supra note 321, at 118-19.
330 A closely related phenomenon is cogently described in DVORKIN ET AL., supra note
323, at 2 (in the book's introduction):
The task of learning these [analytical] skills is a difficult, perhaps never-ending
one, and it is not surprising that it absorbs most of the energy of teachers and
students. Legal argument has a narrowing and focussing nature and when issues are put beyond the scope of what is legally relevant, by such concepts as
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be waylaid in part by our clinical offerings, by our simulated skills
exercises, and, in our traditional classrooms, by marshalling when
we can-and acknowledging the significance of-the narrative
contents and contexts of the cases we teach?
CONCLUSION

Investigating the background of Brown v. Voss, and telling and·
retelling the stories of the case through the sections of this Article,
has been, in the lawyer's cliched metaphor, like peeling away layers
of an onion. The day I visited Parcels A, B, and C and interviewed
Mr. Voss, I sat with him in the utility building the Browns built on
Parcel B, in an area he was using as a workshop. We could not sit
in his house, he said, because his wife was away in the hospital,
recovering from hip surgery. He had just returned from his daily
visit when I telephoned. We sat at his work table, with his ammunition-reloading equipment spread out in front of us and his hunting knife stuck upright in the surface. When we were almost done
talking, as the sun dropped behind the hillside at our backs, I carelessly asked him how many children he had. I had been confused
by the personal history he related.
In response he told me a terrible story of the death of the
older of his two sons, which occurred before the Vosses bought the
property on the Hood Canal. His son was his hunting and fishing
companion, an athletic and intelligent high school student. Believing he was suffering only from a minor wrestling injury, Mr. Voss
was caring for him at home after a visit to the doctor. He put him
to bed on the living room sofa. Early the next morning he found
him on the living room floor, "cold."331 As Mr. Voss spoke, and his
eyes clouded white with grief, I thought about his prominent "No
Trespassing" signs and his report of Mr. Brown's complaint, when
the men first met, that his nephew and his nephew's infant son had
trespassed on Parcel B. 332
Before I departed, Mr. Voss speculated about why the
Browns, sometime before they abandoned their property, had preprecedent, justiciability or procedure, it does not seem fruitful to put class time
into them. From accepting their irrelevance to the argument, we often move
imperceptibly to thinking them irrelevant altogether.
331 Interview with Mr. Voss, supra note 83. I find it difficult to retell this story of his
son's death, and I fear my reader will feel I have invaded Mr. Voss's privacy. But he made
it clear to me both that he had no reluctance to tell his story and that he had no interest in
the academic aftermath of the dispute. He was not interested, for example, either in seeing
the opinion in the case as it is presented in a law school text or in learning about the results
of my research.
332 See supra notes 138, 198 and accompanying text.
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pared a large, fiat area high up on Parcel C. He remained puzzled
by this fact and wondered darkly whether they had been contemplating illegal agriculture. He never doubted that they intended to
build their house where Mr. Brown had testified, on the line between Parcels Band C. To my more skeptical mind, the area
seemed like a perfect site for a large house, high up on the hill for a
good view of the canal, accessible from the upper portion of the
Browns' new road, and a nice distance away from the habitable
utility building on Parcel B. The Browns consistently maintained
that they intended to build on the line between the parcels, but it
seems odd to me, nonetheless, after the Browns had spent more
than $11,000 preparing their property,333 had employed an architect,334 and had located and built their utility building,335 that Mr.
Brown would say in answer to a question at trial about whether the
house would be roughly centered on the line: "No, maybe yes, yes
and no; we haven't located it exactly."336
In the parody of conventional education with which I began
the Introduction, Huck confides in his letter to Tom's aunt that Jim
has come to him for help escaping. "Talk about ethical questions!
I didn't know what to do. And my ethics text ... just didn't seem
to help."337 He also reports that "all these months of study have
really helped me establish my priorities, and I'm already thinking
about college and career. No more wasted moves for me. Judge
Thatcher has been urging me to consider a career in law."338 If
Huck does go to the bar, I hope he remembers the lessons he
learned on the river in '!\vain's account as well as the ones he studied in the summer school classroom. 339 I hope he thinks hard and
333
334

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
1i"ial Transcript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 131·32 (direct examination of Mr. Brown).
Mr. Brown testified that the Browns' architect, a resident of Alaska, "came down and
oversaw the property, and gave us general ideas of grades and so forth, so we could some·
what conform to what he needed for the type of home we have in mind." Mr. Brown said
that "[i]n all probability" this architect would design their home for them. Id.
335 See supra notes 160·64 and accompanying text.
336 ThaI 1i"anscript, supra note 48, pt. II, at 69.
337 The Talk of the Town, supra note 1, at 27.
338

339

Id.

On learning the technical art of river boat piloting, Mark Twain related how he asked
an experienced pilot how he would ever be able to tell a wind reef and a bluff reef apart.
"I can't tell you. It is an instinct. By and by you will just naturally know one
from the other, but you never will be able to explain why or how you know
them apart."
It turned out to be true. The face of the water, in time, became a wonder·
ful book-a book that was a dead language to the uneducated passenger, but
which told its mind to me without reserve, delivering its most cherished secrets
as clearly as if it uttered them with a voice.
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creatively about how to translate his clients' stories into the language of law, with both his head and his heart. 340

MARK TwAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI 57 (Airmont Classic ed. 1965) (1883) (excerpted at
greater length in the section on "Learning the Language of the Law" in JAMES B. WHITE,
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 10-12 (1973)).
340 As Curtis J. Berger passionately wrote: "I believe that legal education is too singlemindedly absorbed in affairs of the head and too inattentive to-indeed, rejecting ofmatters of the heart. ... I believe that the head is attached to the heart .... " The Legal
Profession's Need for a Human Commitment, 3 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY GENERAL EDUCATION SEMINAR REPORTS No.2, 13-15 (1975).

